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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This research studies the pathways that link welfare receipt across generations in 
Australia. Our analysis not only calculates the intergenerational correlation in welfare, 
but also quantify the portion of that correlation that operates through key mechanisms. 
Our data come from administrative welfare records for young Australians (aged 23 – 26) 
and their parents over nearly two decades which have been linked to survey responses 
from young people at age 18.  
Together, the pathways we consider jointly account for nearly a third (32.2 percent) of 
the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation and more than half (52.6 
percent) of the link between parental welfare participation and young people’s total 
welfare benefits.  
The primary mechanism linking welfare receipt across generations is the failure to 
complete high school. Young Australians in welfare-reliant families experience more 
disruptions in their schooling through school changes, residential mobility, school 
expulsions and school suspensions. They also receive less financial support from their 
families. Both of these negatively affect their chances of completing high school and 
avoiding the welfare roll.  
Young Australians’ risk-taking behavior – for example, smoking, illicit drug use, 
delinquency and pregnancy – is also a key pathway in transmitting welfare reliance across 
generations. Physical and mental health, academic achievement, and work-welfare 
attitudes, in contrast, have a more modest role in intergenerational welfare. The lack of 
strong evidence that work-welfare attitudes drive the intergenerational correlation in 
welfare receipt is at odds with cultural explanations of intergenerational welfare which 
attribute welfare dependency to the values that children acquire from their parents and 
neighbors. 
Taken together, our results present a clear focus for policy action; schools, communities 
and governments must find better ways to support the education of children in welfare-
reliant families. The importance of parental financial support in transmitting 
disadvantage across generations calls into question the wisdom of Australian policies that 
increasingly shift the financial burden of supporting young people from the public purse 
to their families. 
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ABSTRACT 
Our goal is to investigate the pathways that link welfare receipt across generations. We 
undertake a mediation analysis in which we not only calculate the intergenerational 
correlation in welfare, but also quantify the portion of that correlation that operates 
through key mechanisms. Our data come from administrative welfare records for young 
people (aged 23 – 26) and their parents over nearly two decades which have been linked 
to survey responses from young people at age 18. The mediators we consider jointly 
explain nearly a third (32.2 percent) of the intergenerational correlation in welfare 
participation and more than half (52.6 percent) of the link between parental welfare 
participation and young people’s total welfare benefits. The primary mechanism linking 
welfare receipt across generations is the failure to complete high school. Adolescents in 
welfare-reliant families experience more disruptions in their schooling (e.g., school 
changes and residential mobility, expulsions and suspensions) and receive less financial 
support from their families both of which impact on their chances of completing high 
school and avoiding the welfare roll. Young people’s risk-taking behavior (smoking, illicit 
drug use, delinquency and pregnancy) is also a key mechanism underpinning 
intergenerational welfare reliance. Physical and mental health, work-welfare attitudes 
and academic achievement, in contrast, have a more modest role in transmitting welfare 
receipt across generations. 
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1. Introduction  
Children in welfare-reliant families experience more adverse events and often must overcome 
additional hurdles in completing their education, moving into employment and achieving 
financial security. The result is that in many countries there is a strong intergenerational 
correlation in worklessness and welfare participation (see Moffitt 1992; Page 2004; and Black 
& Devereux 2011 for reviews). The nature of the challenges disadvantaged children face – and 
their consequences – are not fully understood, however. Growing up in a poor family does not 
always lead to poverty in adulthood (Duncan & Brooks-Gunn 1997); yet we still do not fully 
understand how some poor children escape intergenerational poverty and what keeps others 
rooted there (McLachlan et al. 2013). Identifying the pathways through which intergenerational 
disadvantage occurs – and designing effective policy solutions – is critical to helping poor 
children avoid becoming poor adults.  
We contribute to the evidence base on intergenerational disadvantage by analyzing the 
pathways through which parents’ welfare participation is passed on to their children. Welfare 
receipt is a broader marker of entrenched disadvantage than is traditional income poverty. It 
reflects not only a lack of income, but also low levels of wealth, poor health, inadequate 
housing and limited aspirations. As such, our analysis extends previous studies of 
intergenerational income persistence (e.g., Blanden et al. 2007). The mediation analysis we 
undertake moves beyond the calculation of overall intergenerational correlations in welfare 
participation by also quantifying the portion of that correlation that operates through key 
mechanisms (see Hicks & Tingley 2011). This allows us to develop important insights into the 
relative importance of different pathways in producing intergenerational disadvantage. 
The data we exploit come from the 2006 Youth in Focus (YIF) Project which collected 
detailed survey data from a representative sample of young Australians (aged 18) and matched 
those data to their families’ administrative welfare records over the previous decade. 
Subsequently, the YIF data were updated to incorporate the 2006–2014 administrative welfare 
records of young people themselves. These matched survey-administrative data are ideally 
suited to our purposes. The YIF survey data provide the critical contextual detail that 
administrative sources do not (Corak 2006), while our administrative records provide accurate, 
detailed (fortnightly) information about welfare participation in a way that surveys typically 
cannot (Pierret 2001). Together, these data offer a truly unique opportunity to study the welfare 
participation of an entire birth cohort and their families over two decades.  
Explanations for intergenerational welfare participation can be classified into three 
main categories (see Stenberg 2000; Bartholomae et al. 2004; Page 2004; and Boschman et al. 
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2019  for reviews). Cultural (or behavioral) explanations center on the role of childhood welfare 
in reducing the information and/or social (stigma) costs associated with welfare participation 
in adulthood. Structural (or economic) explanations, on the other hand, attribute 
intergenerational welfare dependency to the effects of constrained financial, parenting or social 
resources on investments in children’s development. Finally, policy-related explanations 
consider the incentives to work or adopt specific family structures that are inherent in the design 
of the welfare system itself.        
A strength of our analysis is that we use a single analysis framework and the same data 
to consider a broad range of potential mechanisms including: educational attainment and 
achievement, employment, risk-taking behavior, health, attitudes towards work and welfare, 
locus of control and parenting (financial support, co-residence, parenting style). Previous 
studies have had a more limited focus, assessing some mechanisms in isolation and others not 
at all. This has left critical gaps in the literature. While theories of welfare cultures, for example, 
largely attribute welfare participation to the values and norms that children learn from their 
parents and neighbors (see Patterson 1986; Duncan et al. 1988; Corcoran 1995), there is no 
empirical evidence that work-welfare attitudes actually contribute to the intergenerational 
correlation in welfare participation. Similarly, parenting clearly matters for human 
development (Heckman 2011; Dopeke et al. 2019); yet we do not understand the extent to 
which intergenerational welfare participation arises out of families’ parenting decisions. Our 
comprehensive approach allows us to not only fill these gaps, but also to assess the relative 
importance of alternative mechanisms in producing intergenerational disadvantage and shine a 
light on the most promising avenues for policy interventions. 
 Taken together, the mediators we consider jointly explain nearly a third (32.2 percent) of 
the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation and more than half (52.6 percent) of 
the link between parental welfare participation and the total welfare dollars that young people 
receive. The primary mechanism linking welfare receipt across generations is the failure to 
complete high school. More than a third of the overall relationship between parents’ welfare 
participation and their adult children’s total welfare benefits is due to differences in young 
people’s chances of dropping out of high school. Intergenerational welfare also operates 
through the curriculum choices and educational achievements of those who do complete high 
school as well as young people’s risk-taking behavior and the co-residential and financial 
support that they receive from their parents. In contrast, physical and mental health and work-
welfare attitudes have at best a modest role in transmitting welfare receipt across generations. 
Several of these results represent new findings, bringing a fresh perspective to the literature on 
intergenerational disadvantage. 
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  We pair our overview analysis with a thorough investigation of the pivotal role of 
education in generating intergenerational disadvantage. Our measures of students’ middle-
school experiences, curriculum choices, academic achievements and motivation for dropping 
out of high school allow us to investigate the role of education in transmitting welfare receipt 
across generations in a way that has not been possible before. Boschman et al. (2019), for 
example, attribute the small mediating effect of children’s education that they find to the 
limitations of their data. Richer data such as ours are necessary to fully understand the 
importance of education as a mechanism producing intergenerational welfare receipt. In 
particular, we highlight the complex educational challenges faced by disadvantaged children. 
Children in welfare-reliant families, for example, experience more suspensions and expulsions 
from school, raising the risk of dropping out of high school and, subsequently, receiving 
welfare benefits themselves. Parental welfare is also associated with increased smoking and 
risk-taking more generally, both of which, in turn, are associated with greater chances of 
dropping out of high school. The good news is that – if disadvantaged young people do manage 
to complete high school on an academic track – most of these early life experiences will not 
result in greater welfare receipt subsequently. There is a clear policy mandate: schools, 
communities and governments must find better ways to support the education of children in 
welfare-reliant families.   
  
2. Australian Social Policy Context 
Australia is characterized by a regulated labor market with high minimum wages (Bray 2013); 
a health system that provides universal health care (Glover 2016); an education system with a 
high degree of choice and competition (Perry & Southwell 2014); and a welfare system that 
provides low, but essentially universal, cash benefits for those in most need (Whiteford 2010). 
Social mobility is lower than is the case in much of Europe, but higher than is true in the United 
States (Cobb-Clark 2019). 
 The 1991 Social Security Act provides the legislative basis for the social security system 
and social security law is administered by the Department of Human Services through an 
administrative agency known as Centrelink. Responsibility for social policy is shared between 
the Department of Social Services (DSS), the Department of Education, and the Department of 
Employment, Skills, Small and Family Business.  
 Unlike the case in the United States, the Australian social assistance system delivers 
welfare benefits to a broad cross-section of the working-age population through a range of core 
social assistance benefits (see Table 1). Disabled individuals (aged 16+) receive a Disability 
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Support Pension (DSP); those who are responsible for caring for a severely disabled person 
can receive the Carer Payment (CP). Low-income families with young dependent children 
receive parenting benefits. Single-parent families are eligible for Parenting Payment Single 
(PPS), while couple-headed families are eligible for Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP). 
Unemployed individuals (aged 22+) meeting certain activity tests receive unemployment 
benefits in the form of Newstart Allowance (NA).1 Finally, Youth Allowance Jobseeker (YAJ) 
provides support to young adults (aged <22) who are unemployed.2  
Table 1 Here 
 Australia ranks sixth lowest in the OECD in terms of the proportion of gross domestic 
product spent on public social spending cash transfers (OECD 2019); yet nearly 80 percent of 
public social cash spending occurs through income and asset-tested benefits – a rate that is 
nearly three times that in the U.S. and U.K. (OECD 2014). Unemployment and student 
allowances are also subject to activity tests (e.g., seeking work; studying or training). Parenting 
payments disproportionately flow to women, however, all other benefits are largely gender-
neutral. Consequently, the rate of social assistance receipt among working-age women (36.3 
percent) is only 6 percentage-points higher than that among working-age men (30.7 percent) 
(Tseng & Wilkins 2003, Table 4). 
 This institutional context makes Australia a particularly interesting case study for 
understanding the mechanisms underpinning intergenerational welfare participation. Unlike 
the United States where welfare is a state responsibility, Australia offers the opportunity to 
study the dynamics of welfare participation at a national level. Moreover, all Australian social 
benefits are administered (and recorded) through a single national administrative agency 
(Centrelink). This means that we can study participation not only in specific welfare programs, 
but also the entire social safety.   
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Mediation Analysis 
The pathways to welfare receipt are rooted in people’s early life experiences. Human 
capabilities form through a cumulative process subject to critical investment periods (see 
Cunha & Heckman 2007; Kautz et al. 2014). Yet families’ capacity to invest in their children’s 
 
1 In contrast to Canada and the United States which operate unemployment insurance systems, unemployment 
benefits in Australia are a key element of the social assistance system and are paid out of general tax revenue. 
2 Although Youth Allowance (YA) also supplements the incomes of young adults who are studying or training – 
and hence is considered to be an income-support payment by the Australian Government – given our focus on 
social and economic disadvantage, we exclude YA (student), YA (apprentice) and YA (other) from our definition 
of welfare. See Cobb-Clark et al. (2017) for details. 
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education, health and human development will almost certainly be disrupted by the episodes 
of poverty, instability and family crisis that are the catalyst for welfare participation. The risk 
is that this permanently limits children and adolescent’s life chances through the numerous life 
outcomes (e.g., mental and physical health, employment, risky behavior, financial wellbeing, 
etc.) that fundamentally depend on the cognitive, non-cognitive and socio-emotional skills that 
they acquire. At the same time, adverse personal circumstances (e.g. poor health, relationship 
breakdowns), structural factors (recessions, tight housing markets), and bad luck can all 
contribute to people’s need for social assistance.   
 Our objective is to shed light on the various pathways through which parental welfare 
participation is transmitted to their children. Mediation analysis is ideally suited to this task. It 
allows us to quantify the extent to which the effect of a treatment (in our case, parental welfare 
participation) on an outcome (children’s welfare receipt) is explained by a particular 
mechanism (see, e.g., Baron & Kenny 1986; Blanden et al. 2007; Karlson & Holm 2011; 
Karlson et al. 2012; Tubeuf et al. 2012; Cobb-Clark & Zhu 2017; Mendolia & Siminski 2017). 
This allows us to consider each in isolation as well as their overall joint effect. 
 We focus on several key mechanisms. Educational attainment is one mechanism that 
appears to transmit delinquency and disadvantage to adult wages and employment (Gregg & 
Machin 2000) and early life conditions to adult health (Tubeuf et al. 2012) and wealth 
(Mendolia & Siminski 2017). Some studies link welfare participation to low self-efficacy 
(external locus of control), i.e., the belief that much of what happens in life is beyond one’s 
own control (see Kunz & Kalil 1999 for a review). There is also evidence that disadvantage is 
associated with youth engaging in more risky behavior (e.g., Gruber 2009; Cobb-Clark et al. 
2012; Omura et al. 2014; Heerde et al. 2015), which may increase contact with police. 
Unfortunately, “involvement with the criminal justice system may be an increasingly common 
stumbling block along the path to adulthood” (Raphael 2007 p. 2). Disadvantaged young people 
also do not always receive the same financial and co-residential support from their families in 
making the human capital investments that are critical to labor market success (Edidin et al. 
2012; Cobb-Clark & Gørgens 2014). Finally, we investigate the role of work-welfare attitudes 
and parenting which are often thought to play a role in limiting social and economic mobility 
(e.g., Duncan et al. 1988; Ermisch 2008). 
 
3.2 Estimation Model  
We begin by assuming that youth’s welfare receipt (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌) – as measured by either the extensive 
(participation) or intensive (total dollars) margin – is given by the following:  
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𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,                                           (1)  
and  
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,                                                           (2) 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 is parental welfare participation, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of family background and 
demographic characteristics and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 are idiosyncratic error terms. The mediating factors 
(or vector of factors) that we consider, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, are indexed by j and are functions of parental 
welfare participation as well as family background and demographic characteristics. Thus, 𝛼𝛼1 
captures the direct effect of parental welfare participation on the youth’s welfare receipt, while 
𝛾𝛾1 captures the effect of parental welfare participation on the mediating factor.  
 Next, we obtain the total and mediating effects by substituting (2) into (1):  
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3(𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 =  (𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾0) + (𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1)𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + (𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾2)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖).      (3) 
In Equation (3), the mediating effect of parental welfare receipt operating through 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1, 
while the overall effect of parental welfare participation on youth’s welfare receipt is equal to 
the direct plus mediating effect (𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1). We refer to this as our baseline model. 
 Often researchers estimate models with (Equation 1) and without (Equation 3) controls 
for mediating factors allowing the overall effect of the regressor of interest to be compared to 
its direct effect (e.g., Mendolia & Siminski 2017). One of the difficulties with this is that the 
order in which covariates are added to the model can have substantial effects on the conclusions 
one draws (Gelbach 2016). Instead, we follow Tubeuf et al. (2012) in directly estimating the 
determinants of the mediating factors themselves, allowing their impact to be calculated and 
more complex relationships between mediating variables to be considered.3 In our case, we 
first generate an estimate of the direct effect of parental welfare participation on youth’s welfare 
receipt (𝛼𝛼1) by estimating Equation (1). We then estimate 𝛾𝛾1 using a series of mediating effects 
models based on Equation (2). Finally, we calculate the overall effect of parental welfare 
participation on their adult children’s welfare receipt using the relationships given in Equation 
(3). All models are estimated using linear regression. Standard errors for mediating effects are 
bootstrapped (400 replications) using a stratified sample with replacement.  
   
3.3 Identification  
Estimating the causal effect of an intervention (treatment) on outcomes can be achieved 
through a well-designed randomized experiment. Often, however, we wish to know not only 
 
3 Blanden et al. (2007) adopt a similar approach when decomposing the intergenerational correlation in income.  
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whether a treatment had an impact, but also why. Identifying causal mediating effects is more 
challenging than identifying treatment effects. Knowing that the Perry Preschool Project 
enhanced children’s skills and improved their educational outcomes, for example, is not 
sufficient to establish that it is the improvement in skills that caused the improvement in 
outcomes (Heckman et al. 2013). The causal identification of mediating factors requires that 
sequential ignorability be maintained; i.e., i) conditional on pre-determined covariates, the 
treatment of interest is independent of all potential values of the outcome and mediating factors; 
and ii) the observed mediating factor is independent of all potential outcomes given the 
observed predetermined covariates and treatment of interest (see, Imai et al. 2010; Hicks & 
Tingley 2011; Mendolia & Siminski 2017).   
 In our case, neither of these conditions is likely to be met. Parental welfare participation 
is not exogenously assigned; nor do we have (quasi) experimental variation in welfare access 
among equally disadvantaged families.4 Gottschalk’s (1996) method of exploiting parents’ 
future welfare participation to bound the likely causal component of the intergenerational 
relationship in welfare receipt is not appropriate in our case given the age of young people in 
our sample and the length of our data window; we simply do not have sufficient measures of 
parents’ future welfare participation.5 One advantage of our data, however, is that the mediating 
factors we consider are measured at least five years (age 18) before youths’ welfare outcomes 
(age 23–26) reducing the potential for reverse causality. Still, there may still be unobserved 
confounders that affect both our mediating factors and youths’ welfare participation even after 
we control for parents’ welfare histories and other observed co-variates. For these reasons, we 
regard this as a descriptive analysis; our results do not identify causal mechanisms per se.   
 Nonetheless, our analysis is very informative about the drivers of economic opportunity 
and the likely channels through which intergenerational welfare receipt is occurring. Isolating 
the problems to be solved – and the types of interventions that might prove useful –requires 
that we understand the “landscape of needs and opportunities”; large-scale descriptive analyses 
like ours provide this landscape (Leob et al. 2017, p. 1). Knowing that much of the effect of 
parental welfare participation flows through children’s diminished educational attainment and 
increased risk-taking, for example, not only clarifies the policy priorities, but also allows the 
resources available for supporting children in welfare-reliant families to be better targeted.    
 
 
4 See Cobb-Clark et al. (2017) for a discussion of studies investigating the causal effect of access to welfare on 
welfare participation. 
5 See Boschman et al. (2019) who adopt an approach similar to Gottschalk’s in an attempt to isolate causal 
mediation effects. 
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4. Data 
Our analysis relies on data from the Youth in Focus (YIF) Project which was designed to study 
the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic disadvantage.6 The YIF Project is unique 
in combining survey data for a birth cohort of young Australians (aged 18) with data from the 
Transgenerational Data Set (TDS) which provides historical administrative data (from age 
eight) on the social security benefits their families received while they were growing up. 
Although the YIF Project ended in 2008, an extension of the TDS data in 2014 allows us to 
analyze the social assistance young people subsequently receive in early adulthood (to age 26). 
 Together, these matched administrative-survey data provide a valuable opportunity to 
circumvent many of the data limitations that have plagued researchers in the past and develop 
new insights into the mechanisms producing intergenerational welfare receipt. Our 
administrative data are drawn from the Australian Government’s administrative system and 
capture the universe of Australians receiving social assistance over an 18-year period allowing 
us to minimize the biases associated with measurement error, recall issues, sample attrition or 
short study periods. Our survey data provide the contextual perspective necessary to understand 
the pathways through which welfare participation is passed from parents to children. 
 
4.1 Data Construction and Estimation Sample 
The YIF Project used Centrelink administrative records to identify all young people born 
between October 1987 and March 1988 who ever had contact with the Australian social 
security system before March 2005. Young people are in the administrative data if they receive 
benefits themselves. Most, however, are in the data because a family member (usually a parent) 
received at least one Centrelink payment at some point before 2005 (when they turned 18) 
which depended in part on his or her relationship to the youth. The Centrelink data for this birth 
cohort and their families make up the TDS.    
 The Australian social security system is nearly universal for families with children with 
some payments such as the Child Care Benefit having no income test at all and others, such as 
the Family Tax Benefit, being denied only to families in the top quintile of the income 
distribution.7 At the other extreme are social assistance (welfare) payments that are directed 
towards low-income individuals and subject to income, asset and/or activity tests. Census data 
indicate that over 98 percent of our birth cohort is in the TDS data (Breunig et al. 2009). 
 
6 For details see Breunig et al. (2007; 2009) and http://youthinfocus.anu.edu.au. 
7 To place these payments in context, similar benefits in the United States are provided to families through the tax 
system in the form of standard deductions for dependent children and childcare rebates.  
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 In 2006, phone interviews and a self-completion questionnaire were conducted with a 
stratified random sample of the young people (then aged 18) captured in the TDS.8 The 
resulting YIF survey data provide detailed information about young people’s family 
background, relationship with parents, educational outcomes, attitudes, mental and physical 
health, and risk-taking behavior (Breunig et al. 2009). Importantly, over 96 percent (N = 3,916) 
of survey respondents also agreed to have their YIF survey data linked to their TDS data 
providing fortnightly information on the welfare payments their families received while they 
were growing up. We use the 2014 version of the TDS constructed by the DSS which includes 
fortnightly payments by Centrelink over the 1996–2014 period.9 This allows us to link the 
social security records of YIF respondents in young adulthood (aged 18–26) to those of their 
families while they were growing up (aged 8–17) and to their survey responses at age 18.   
 
4.2 Welfare Receipt  
We use the TDS data to create summary measures of welfare receipt for young adults and their 
families. Each youth is matched to their primary caregiver and we create parental welfare 
participation measures using the primary caregiver’s administrative welfare records.10 Parental 
welfare participation is measured between 1996 and 2002 when youths (aged 8–15) are 
ineligible to receive welfare benefits in their own right. Young people’s own welfare receipt is 
measured during early adulthood (ages 23-26) when their formal education is ending and they 
are entering the workforce. We capture the extensive welfare margin using indicators of 
welfare participation – separately for youths and their families – over these defined periods.11 
The intensive welfare margin is captured by the total dollars of support youth received.  
 We use these variables to investigate the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt 
for our YIF sample. In Table 2 (top panel) we condition youth welfare receipt on parental 
welfare participation. Young adults are on average 17.8 percentage points (pp.) (1.9 times) 
more likely to receive welfare between the ages of 23–26 if their parents received welfare while 
 
8 Specifically, the TDS was used to stratify youths into one of six groups depending on the recency and intensity 
of the family’s welfare receipt. As a result, all summary and descriptive statistics are weighted.   
9 Multiple versions of the TDS have been constructed over the years. The initial TDS was constructed in the 1990s 
and was the basis for the early work of the DSS staff on intergenerational disadvantage (McCoull & Pech 2000; 
Pech & McCoull 2000). In the early 2000s, a second version of the data (TDS2) was created and matched to 
survey data as part of the YIF Project which ended in 2008 (Breunig et al. 2009). In 2014, the TDS2 data were 
extended (referred to as TDS2-E) to include updated administrative records for 2008-2014. We use TDS2-E data.   
10 Biological relationships are not observed in the Centrelink data; however, we do know the person who had the 
primary caring responsibility for the youth at every point in time up until the youth turned 18 years old. This 
allows us to identify the person who had the longest duration of primary care, and in cases of ties, select the mother 
using an algorithm based on gender and age. This strategy has been used in previous research and it successfully 
identified biological mothers (biological parents) in 96.5 (98.6) percent of cases (Breunig et al. 2009). 
11 Appendix Table A1 provides detailed variable definitions. Appendix Table A2 presents summary statistics. 
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they were growing up. Children in welfare reliant families also receive $5,591 more in welfare 
benefits on average. This disparity total welfare benefits is driven by differences in the duration 
of receipt (5.6 vs. 16.1 fortnights); average benefits per fortnight differ by only $17 AUD.  
Table 2 Here 
 
4.3 Mediators  
We supplement the TDS administrative data with unique data from the YIF survey about the 
youth’s experiences and outcomes up to age 18. This provides the detail necessary to 
investigate a broad range of potential channels through which welfare participation may be 
passed across generations. We focus our attention on factors that are significant predictors of 
young people’s welfare participation and which appear to be influenced by parents’ welfare 
experiences.12 To this end, we create measures of the following potential mediators of 
intergenerational welfare participation: i) education; ii) risky behaviors; iii) parenting; iv) 
work-welfare attitudes; v) health; vi) employment; and vii) locus of control.13 Previous studies 
have shown that all matter for the transitions that children make into successful adult roles.  
 We define our key measures as follows. Education: Educational attainment and 
achievement is captured with: i) an indicator of whether the youth dropped out of high school; 
ii) an indicator of whether the youth received a university entrance score (known as an ATAR 
score)14; and iii) youths’ university entrance score (ranked from 30-99.99).15 Risky Behavior: 
Our risky behaviors include indicators for: i) currently smoking tobacco; and ii) ever becoming 
pregnant (gotten someone pregnant). We also conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) 
which revealed support for two components: drug use (e.g., marijuana and illicit drugs) and 
delinquent behavior (e.g., contact with police (juvenile justice); running away from home; 
hanging out with a bad crowd; problem drinking) for which we create standardized factor 
scores. Parenting: We capture parenting using measures of parenting style and parents’ 
financial support. Specifically, we construct factor-based indexes of parenting style – i.e., 
respectful parenting and parental monitoring – following Cobb-Clark et al. (2019). Parents’ 
financial support is captured through indicators for whether the young person: i) lives 
 
12 Factors do not have a significant effect on youths’ welfare participation will have no mediating effect as  
𝛼𝛼3� = 0; thus, we do not consider them in the analysis. Orri et al (2019) follows a similar approach. See the Data 
Appendix for an explanation of how we rule some variables into and others out of the set of potential mediators.   
13 Details regarding our variable construction are provided in the Data Appendix. 
14 The Australian Tertiary Admissions Rank (or ATAR) corresponds to the percentile rank (30.0 – 99.99) of each 
student in the overall cohort of high school graduates within their Australian state and conversion formulas allow 
students to be compared across jurisdictions. ATAR scores are used to select students for entry into universities. 
15 A follow-up survey was conducted with young people (aged 20) in 2008. We use these data to provide 
information about youths’ educational attainment if they had not yet left high school in 2006.  
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independently; and ii) has been financially assisted by their parents in last the 12 months when 
they were aged 17–18. Work-welfare Attitudes: Our attitude measures include indicators of 
whether the youth believes: i) the unemployed are the government’s (rather than a family) 
responsibility; ii) unemployment benefits are too low (rather than too high); and iii) their own 
ambition is extremely important for getting ahead in life. Health: We capture mental and 
physical health using indicators of whether the youth (age 18): i) has been diagnosed with 
depression and/or received treatment for mental or emotional issues; ii) has health issues that 
limit (or would limit) work; iii) is obese (BMI≥30); and iv) their degree of physical activity. 
Employment: We use by an indicator of whether the youth was ever employed. Locus of 
Control: Finally, we use a PCA to construct a standardized index that is increasing in internal 
control (i.e., the belief that outcomes stem from one’s own effort) (e.g., Caliendo et al. 2015).16   
 By age 18, young people growing up in welfare-reliant families already differ in their life 
experiences and future prospects (see Table 2 bottom panel). They are more likely to drop out 
of high school (18.3 pp.), and, conditional on completing high school, they are less likely to 
obtain a university entrance score (12.4 pp.) and if they do, they score lower than their peers. 
They are also more likely to experience depression (4.2 pp.) and live independently (8.0 pp.) 
but are less likely to receive financial support from their parents (16.0 pp.). While their views 
about the importance of ambition for getting ahead in life are similar to those of their peers, 
young people growing up on welfare are more likely to support a generous welfare system (5.8-
12.0 pp.). Young people in welfare families also engage in more risky behaviors, are generally 
less internal (more external) in their perceptions of control and are more likely to be obese and 
engage in less physical exercise. Finally, the parenting they have received is characterized by 
a lower degree of respectfulness and monitoring. In other respects, however, young people 
growing up on welfare have experiences and outcomes that do not differ from other young 
people in non-welfare-reliant families.17 
 
5. Results 
Young people have higher rates of welfare participation and receive more in welfare benefits 
between the ages of 23–26 if their parents also received welfare while they were growing up 
 
16 See Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details. Note that item non-response differs across measures. In particular, 
our measures of parenting style, risk behaviors, and locus of control rely on data from YIF the self-completion 
questionnaire which has a lower response rate (71 percent) than the main interview which was conducted by phone 
(Breunig et al. 2009). As we are not interested in comparing coefficients across regressions, we choose to retain 
the largest possible sample by not conditioning on having complete data for all measures (see Table A2). 
17 Unconditionally, most of our mediators are significantly related to parental welfare participation (Table 2). 
Once we estimate Equation (2) and condition on basic demographics and background controls, however, some of 
these significant differences disappear (i.e., 𝛾𝛾1� = 0) implying that there is no mediating effect. 
12 
 
(see Table 2). Our objective is to understand the potential mechanisms that underlie this 
intergenerational relationship in welfare receipt. Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We first 
undertake an overview analysis in which the relative importance of a broad range of potential 
mediators are considered; this allows us to rule some mechanisms into the possibility set and 
others out. We then conduct a more detailed investigation of the single most important pathway 
linking welfare participation across generations – the failure to complete high school – 
accounting for the effects of parental welfare participation on some of the key drivers of 
educational outcomes (e.g., risk taking, financial support, ADHD, residential mobility, etc.). 
 
5.1 Overview: The Pathways to Intergenerational Welfare Receipt  
Results from our overview analysis of the key channels linking parents’ welfare participation 
to that of their children are presented in Table 3; parallel results linking parental welfare 
participation to the amount of welfare benefits their children receive can be found in Table 4. 
The results in Table 3 are informative about the extensive margin of young people’s welfare 
reliance; the results in Table 4 reflect the intensive margin. In both tables, the overall effect of 
parental welfare participation on the welfare receipt of their adult children is given in column 1. 
These estimates of the overall intergenerational relationship in: i) welfare participation; and ii) 
total benefit receipt (conditional on demographic and family background characteristics) result 
from estimating the model in Equation (3). The overall effect of parental welfare participation 
is the sum of the direct effect of parental welfare (column 2) and the share of the parental 
welfare effect that operates through each mediator (i.e., the mediating effect) (column 3). Large 
mediating effects (in relative terms) indicate that the mediating factor represents a clear 
pathway linking welfare receipt across generations (see column 4). Our education, 
employment, and locus of control measures are analyzed individually; for these mediators, each 
row in Tables 3 and 4 presents the results of a separate estimation of the baseline model in 
Equations (1) – (3). Risky behavior, parenting, attitudes, and health are captured by multiple 
mediators, however, which we analyze as a group.18 The overall effect of the mediators as a 
group is presented in the first row of each panel, while the separate mediating effects of each 
individual mediator follow in subsequent rows.   
Conditional on their demographic characteristics, family background and geographic 
locations, young people are 12 percentage points (1.6 times) more likely to receive welfare 
benefits between the ages of 23–26 if their parents were also welfare participants than if they 
 
18 In effect, the mediating factor, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, in the baseline model in Equations (1) – (3) is replaced by a vector with the 
individual mediators as elements. 
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were not (see Table 3); they also receive $3,874 more in total benefits (see Table 4).19 The 
intergenerational correlation in welfare participation in Australia is in line that in other 
countries. Boschman et al. (2019), for example, find that, in the Netherlands, people are 1.9 
times more likely to receive welfare benefits if their mothers also receive benefits than if neither 
parent does; this ratio climbs to 2.6 if, in addition, their fathers also receive benefits. Similarly, 
Page (2004 p. 231) estimates that U.S. women are 2.8 times as likely to receive welfare if their 
mothers also received welfare, while Stenberg (2000, Table 1, p. 231) estimates that in Sweden 
the likelihood of adults receiving social assistance is approximately 2.5 times higher if their 
families received social assistance while they were growing up.   
Tables 3 and 4 Here 
 
5.1.1 Education 
Education emerges as the primary pathway linking welfare receipt across generations. Nearly 
a quarter (22.0 percent) of the overall effect of parents’ welfare participation on their adult 
children’s welfare participation stems from the disparity in young people’s chances of 
completing high school. Consistent with the considerable international evidence linking socio-
economic disadvantage with dropping out (Ku & Plotnick 2003; Bukodi & Goldthrpe 2012; 
Kallio et al. 2016), we find that young people in welfare-reliant households are 11.5 percentage 
points (pp.) less likely to complete high school.20 Given the established link between failing to 
complete high school and future welfare reliance (e.g., Coelli et al. 2007), it is not surprising 
that they have higher welfare participation rates as a result.  The failure to complete high school 
explains an even larger share of the total effect of parents’ welfare participation on the intensity 
of young people’s welfare reliance. One third (33.2 percent) of the overall effect of parents’ 
welfare participation on the total dollars that young people receive in benefits between ages 
23–26 is due to their heightened chances of dropping out of high school. 
Parental welfare participation is also transmitted to young people through the curriculum 
choices and educational achievements of those who do complete high school. Australian 
students who graduate from high school meeting minimum coursework requirements (e.g., 
minimum academic units, English language requirements, etc.) are assigned an ATAR score 
based on their academic performance in 11th and 12th grades. Offers of university admission 
 
19 Estimates of the overall effect of parental welfare vary slightly across the rows in Tables 3 and 4 because the 
estimation sample varies as a result of item non-response.  
20 See Appendix Table B1 for estimates from Equation (2) which capture the effects of parental welfare 
participation on the mediating factors, once conditioning on basic demographics and background variables. 
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are made centrally on the basis of students’ ATAR scores (Marks et al., 2001).21 We find that 
12.9 percent of the total effect of parental welfare participation on their children’s participation 
operates through the fact that high school graduates in welfare-reliant families are less likely 
to earn an ATAR score; 5.7 percent is due to the penalty associated with parental welfare on 
the actual ATAR scores for those receiving them. Young people’s ATAR results are even more 
important in explaining the overall effect of parental welfare participation on the intensity of 
their welfare reliance; 22.2 percent of the effect operates through simply receiving an ATAR 
score, while 11.2 percent operates through the ATAR score itself.22  
Thus, young people’s welfare receipt is primarily linked to that of their parents through 
the education they attain; educational achievement plays an important, but more modest role. 
Similarly, Fallesen and Bernardi (2018) find that in Denmark the chances that adolescents 
enroll in and complete upper secondary school is reduced the longer their parents spend on 
welfare; there is no effect on their grade point averages, however. Using administrative data 
for the Netherlands, Boschman et al. (2019) find a small effect of higher education in mediating 
the intergenerational correlation in benefit receipt.    
 
5.1.2 Risk-Taking Behavior and Parenting 
There is ample evidence that poor adolescents take more chances. Young people growing up 
in welfare-reliant families are more likely to have early and unprotected sex, experience 
adolescent pregnancy, engage in delinquent acts, consume illicit substances and be arrested 
(e.g., Harris & Marmer 1996; Duncan & Brooks-Gunn 1997; Cobb-Clark et al. 2012). The 
long-term effect of family social problems may, in fact, operate through deviant behavior 
(Bäckman & Nilsson 2011). Critically, the choices made in adolescence may have long-run 
(perhaps unintended) consequences for young people’s life chances.  
Psychologists have a long history of relating adolescent risk-taking to the quality of the 
parent-child relationship as well as to specific parenting practices including parenting style, 
family management techniques, communication and parental monitoring (see Boyer 2006 and 
 
21 In some states and territories, students’ ATAR scores are derived solely from a state-wide exam; in others, the 
final results of specific subjects are used in combination with standardized tests. A national conversion allows 
comparisons to be made across students educated in different jurisdictions and university places are allocated 
centrally based on student preferences. Programs in fields such as law or medicine are highly competitive and 
often require ATAR scores in the 99th percentile, while most degree programs at Australia’s top-tier universities 
accept only those students in the top quartile of the distribution. Students with ATAR scores toward the bottom 
of the scale are usually not offered any university placement at all.  
22 We also estimated our baseline model replacing the continuous ATAR score with an indicator for receiving an 
ATAR score below 75—the minimum required to be accepted into one of Australia's eight leading research—
intensive universities (known as the Group of Eight). We find that this indicator explains 4.4 percent of overall 
effect of parental welfare participation on their children’s participation.   
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Ryan et al. 2015 for reviews).23 Unfortunately, “economic hardship diminishes parents’ ability 
to interact with and socialize children in ways that are beneficial to their well-being” (Guo & 
Harris 2000, p. 431).24 Economic hardship may also limit parents’ capacity to assist young 
people in completing their education and finding work by providing them with co-residential 
or financial support (Cobb-Clark & Gørgens 2014).  
 Previous research analyzing the YIF data concludes that although young people in 
welfare-reliant families are less likely to co-reside with or receive financial support from their 
parents, a lack of parental support is not the source of the socioeconomic gradient in either 
studying or employment (Cobb-Clark & Gørgens 2014). The extent to which parents monitor 
their young-adult children decreases with welfare reliance (Cobb-Clark et al. 2019). Yet, 
parental welfare is unlikely to cause young people to engage in more risk-taking behavior; 
instead the association between welfare and risk taking seems to stem from the effects of family 
structure, mothers’ own risk-taking decisions and the investments made in children (Cobb-
Clark et al. 2012). These results raise questions about the potential for parental welfare 
participation to be transferred across generations through risk-taking and parenting. 
  Our research adds depth to this literature by investigating whether risky behavior 
mediates the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt. We find that the four behaviors 
we consider (smoking tobacco, illicit drug use, delinquency and pregnancy) are a key 
mechanism underpinning intergenerational welfare reliance. Overall, 18.6 (25.6) percent of the 
intergenerational correlation in welfare participation (total welfare benefits received) is due to 
the disparity in risk-taking associated with family welfare history. This overarching result 
reflects the aggregate effect of the eleven separate risk-taking behaviors captured in our data. 
While there is little evidence of a causal link between different risk behaviors, there clearly is 
a strong correlation between them (see Rees et al. 2001; Rashad & Kaestner 2004; Carpenter 
2007; Acworth et al. 2012; Carpenter & Dobkin 2015). Thus, it is interesting to study risky 
behavior in its entirety. At the same time, some behaviors may be especially consequential.   
   In particular, young people growing up in welfare-reliant households are 5.8 pp. more 
likely than their peers to smoke tobacco (Appendix Table B1). Importantly, this increased 
prevalence of smoking accounts for more than a third of the total mediating effect of risk-taking 
 
23 Experimental evidence indicates, for example, that youths’ risk-taking behavior can respond to the intensity of 
parental monitoring. Stanton et al. (2004) find that an intervention designed to increase parental monitoring was 
effective in reducing suspensions, cigarette smoking, illicit drug use, etc., while U.S. policy changes in the 1990s 
that moved parents from welfare to work led to an increase in adolescents’ self-reported tobacco and alcohol 
consumption, perhaps due to a reduction in parental monitoring (Morris et al. 2001). 
24 This disruption in effective parenting appears to be the mechanism that translates financial stress into adverse 
consequences for children and adolescents (e.g., McLoyd 1998; Bradley & Corwyn 2002; Conger et al. 2002; 
Mistry et al. 2009; and the references therein). 
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on both the extensive (7.1 pp.) and intensive (9.8 pp.) margins of welfare receipt. Slightly less 
than a third of the overall mediating effect of risky behavior operates through teenage 
pregnancy, while the remaining third operates through delinquency (i.e., contact with police 
(juvenile justice); running away from home; hanging out with a bad crowd; problem 
drinking).25 In contrast, the use of marijuana and other illicit drugs are not a mediating factor 
in intergenerational welfare receipt.  
  We can only speculate about the reasons that smoking tobacco mediates the 
intergenerational correlation in welfare. It is well documented that smoking is more prevalent 
among disadvantaged youth; this is in part due to more parental smoking, greater accessibility, 
peer pressure and targeted advertising (Hiscock et al. 2012). While we do not believe smoking 
plays a casual role in predicting welfare receipt, it is likely that the mediation effect we find 
reflects “unobserved circumstances and traits associated with smoking” (Pollack et al. 2001 
p.262). For example, smoking is associated with risk preferences (see Anderson & Mellor 2008 
and references within), depression and anxiety (Morrell & Cohen 2006; Lawrence et al. 2009) 
and experiencing more negative life events (Wills et al. 2002). We find that the use of marijuana 
and other illicit drugs is not associated with youth welfare receipt (see Appendix Table B1). 
However, in separate analysis, we do find limited support for monthly marijuana use as a 
pathway; it accounts for 1.9 percent of the intergenerational correlation in welfare 
participation.26 Similarly, Jayakody et al. (2000) find that the association between marijuana 
use and welfare receipt is smaller than that between smoking and welfare receipt.  
  Parents make many decisions regarding their children’s family structure, social 
networks, neighborhoods, education, etc. which are instrumental in shaping their children’s life 
chances. Some have postulated that disadvantage may be perpetuated from one generation to 
the next through the choices that parents make (see Ermisch 2008; Yi et al. 2015). One of the 
key strengths of our analysis is our ability to directly address this issue by empirically 
examining the role of parenting style (parental warmth and monitoring) and parental support 
(co-residence, financial support) in mediating the intergenerational welfare correlation.   
  We find that overall 9.9 (16.1) percent of the relationship between young adults’ 
welfare participation (total dollars of welfare benefits) and their parents’ welfare participation 
operates through the parenting they receive. The mediating effects of parenting style (i.e., 
 
25 We find parental welfare participation is associated with a 0.19 standard deviation (s.d.) increase in delinquent 
behaviours, while a one s.d. increase in delinquent behaviors increases the likelihood that young people receive 
welfare by 3.8 pp. Parental welfare participation increases the chances of teenage pregnancy by 2.7 pp.; not 
surprisingly pregnancy is associated with a substantial increase in youth welfare participation of 25.7 pp. (see 
Appendix Table B1). 
26 See Appendix Table A8, where we include each individual risky behaviour in the mediating model, rather than 
using the standardised factors for drug use and delinquency.   
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warmth and monitoring) are modest; there is no evidence that respectful parenting mediates 
the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt, while parental monitoring accounts for at 
most 2.4 percent of the correlation. This is reassuring given the evidence that socioeconomic 
disadvantage is often associated with less effective parenting styles (Guo & Harris 2000; Cheng 
2008). The evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic status and specific parenting 
styles is mixed (e.g., Guo & Harris 2000; Davis et al. 2001; Yeung et al. 2002; Davis-Kean 
2005). Like Cobb-Clark et al. (2019), we find monitoring is lower among parents receiving 
welfare, while parental warmth is unaffected (see Appendix Table B1).  Additionally, reduced 
parental monitoring is associated with a greater propensity to receive welfare. The modest 
mediating effect of parental monitoring is likely explained by the relationship between parental 
monitoring and better educational outcomes (Pong et al. 2005; Spera 2005) and less risk-taking 
behavior (e.g., Chilcoat & Anthony 1996; Ethier et al. 2001; Cobb-Clark et al. 2019).        
 The relative lack of parental support – particularly financial support – is, however, an 
important pathway linking parents’ and young adult children’s welfare reliance. Young people 
(age 18) in welfare-reliant families are less likely than their more advantaged peers to be co-
residing with (3.0 pp.) and receiving financial support (11.2 pp.) from their families (see 
Appendix Table B1). This may constrain their ability to complete their education and transition 
successfully into the labor market. Living with one’s parents allows young people to consume, 
save and invest despite credit constraints (e.g., Cox 1990; Ermisch 2003) and to insure 
themselves against bad labor market outcomes (e.g., Card & Lemieux 1997; Kaplan 2012; 
Matsudaira 2016) or relationship breakdowns (e.g., Hamon 1995; Smits et al. 2010). Similarly, 
parents’ financial help in financing education and training costs can result in their adult children 
enjoying higher living standards primarily as a result of improved labor market opportunities 
(e.g., Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein 2001; Cobb-Clark & Gørgens 2014; Rauscher 2016). 
Overall, we find that between 7.4 (welfare participation) and 12.6 (total dollars of welfare 
benefits) percent of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt operates through a 
reduction in parents’ co-residential and financial support. 
 
5.1.3 Work-Welfare Attitudes, Health, Employment, and Locus of Control 
We turn now to consider a broad set of other potential mediators of the intergenerational 
relationship in welfare receipt. These include young people’s attitudes towards work vs. 
welfare as well as their mental and physical health, early employment experiences and locus 
of control. While not an exhaustive list of potential mediators, these factors do encapsulate 
many of the cultural, structural and policy-related phenomenon thought to underpin 
intergenerational disadvantage (see Stenberg 2000).  
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 Cultural explanations of intergenerational welfare have their roots in theories of poverty 
from the 1960s and largely attribute welfare dependency to the values and social norms that 
children acquire from their parents and neighbors (see Duncan et al., 1988; Patterson, 1986; 
Bartholomae et al., 2004). The concern is that growing up in welfare-reliant families (or 
neighborhoods) may weaken children's work ethic and self-reliance by reducing the stigma or 
information costs associated with welfare receipt (Stenberg 2000; Page 2004; Dahl et al. 2014; 
Barón et al. 2015; see Boschman et al. 2019 for a review). Despite being integral to the policy 
debate on welfare dependency, there is little empirical evidence linking welfare-work attitudes 
to exposure to the welfare system. Santiago (1995) and Edwards et al. (2001), for example, 
find no support for the notion that in the United States attitudes towards welfare, low paid work 
and traditional gender roles are associated with an increase in the likelihood of welfare 
dependence.27 In the Australian context, young people are more likely to oppose generous 
social benefits and to believe that social inequality stems from individual characteristics (rather 
than institutional factors) if: i) their mothers share these views; ii) their mothers were employed 
while they were growing up; and iii) their families never received welfare (Barón et al. 2015).  
The question is whether these disparities in work-welfare attitudes lead to different patterns of 
welfare use and, consequently, help us to understand the intergenerational welfare correlation.  
  Structural theories of intergenerational welfare instead attribute dependency to the 
effects of limited financial resources and constrained opportunities. Disadvantaged families 
may struggle, for example, to invest in their children’s human development, perpetuating 
disadvantage across generations. There is extensive evidence that poverty has wide-ranging 
consequences for children’s physical and mental health; cognitive development and readiness 
to learn; and behavioral (emotional) outcomes (see Brooks-Gunn & Duncan 1997; Gupta et al. 
2007; Reiss 2013). Given this, it is not surprising that children and adolescents in welfare-
reliant families often have worse health outcomes. Spady et al. (2001), for example, evaluate 
more than 40,500 administrative health care records in Alberta Canada and conclude that, at 
every age, children in welfare families are nearly twice as likely as their peers to have a mental 
disorder. Welfare receipt is also associated with obesity among young women (Lee et al. 2013). 
 We make an important contribution by providing the first empirical evidence that 
quantifies the extent to which work-welfare attitudes and health are the pathways through 
which welfare receipt is transferred across generations. Our results indicate that 6.4 percent of 
the intergenerational relationship in welfare participation operates though young people’s 
work-welfare attitudes; the mediating effect of health status (6.1 percent) is similar in 
 
27 At the same time, Moore et al. (1995) argue that people’s attitudes and personalities influence the behaviors 
leading to early and premarital childbearing and hence are likely to drive welfare eligibility at least in part.  
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magnitude (see Table 3). Young people’s health status accounts for an even larger share of the 
relationship between parental welfare participation and the total dollars of welfare benefits that 
young people receive. Overall, 9.2 percent of the intensity of welfare support is accounted for 
by young people’s health status – in particular whether they have ever been diagnosed with 
depression and have a health condition that limits their ability to work (see Table 4). Work-
welfare attitudes are somewhat less important, accounting for 5.8 percent of the 
intergenerational link in the total welfare benefits that youths receive. This disparity in the 
relative importance of health status versus work-welfare attitudes in accounting for the 
intensity of welfare receipt is likely explained by the nature of the benefits young people are 
accessing; disability benefits often have a long duration in comparison to unemployment 
benefits. Interestingly, work-welfare attitudes are more important than actual early 
employment experiences in understanding intergenerational welfare receipt. Disparity in 
employment at age 18 accounts for only 3.3 (extensive margin) to 5.0 (intensive margin) 
percent the relationship between parents’ welfare participation and the welfare receipt of their 
young-adult children. Finally, while the degree to which people believe that they have control 
over the outcome of life events has been linked to educational and labor market success (Cobb-
Clark 2015), youths’ locus of control is not an important mediator of intergenerational welfare.  
 
5.1.4 Overview Summary 
Socioeconomic disadvantage is perpetuated across multiple generations through several key 
mechanisms. Taken together, the mediators we consider jointly explain nearly a third (32.2 
percent) of the correlation in welfare participation across generations and more than half (52.6 
percent) of the total welfare support (in dollars) that young people receive.28 While the primary 
mechanism linking welfare receipt across generations is the failure to complete high school, 
intergenerational welfare also operates through young people’s choices about risk-taking 
behavior and the co-residential and financial support that they receive from their parents. 
Physical and mental health, work-welfare attitudes and academic achievement, in contrast, 
have a more modest role in transmitting welfare receipt across generations.  
 
5.2 In Depth: The Failure to Complete High School  
We now turn our focus to an in-depth analysis of the primary mechanisms linking welfare 
receipt across generations – the failure to complete high school.  
 
28 Estimates were obtained by re-estimating the mediation model and including all mediators other than those 
related to the ATAR score.  
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5.2.1 Empirical Approach 
We analyze the mediating role of high school dropout in more detail by estimating a multi-
level mediation model which can account for the possibility of sequential mechanisms 
operating to produce intergenerational welfare receipt. This approach allows us to model 
dropping out of high school as being determined not only by parental welfare participation but 
also by early-life experiences (e.g., risky behaviors, parenting styles, school changes and 
residential mobility, ADHD etc.) that (arguably) occur before the decision to drop out and are 
themselves driven in part by parental welfare participation.29 In effect, this approach sheds light 
on how much of the mediating effect of dropping out operates through prior educational 
experiences. Specifically, we estimate the following model:  
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,                       (4)  
and  
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,                                                  (5a) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 .                              (5b) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of early educational and other experiences (indexed by j) that are likely to 
drive the decision to drop out of high school.  
 The composition of the overall mediating role of the failure to complete high school can 
be constructed by substituting Equations (5a) and (5b) into Equation (4) and rearranging:  
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌 =  (𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿0) + (𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1 + 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1)𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + (𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾2 + 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿2 +
𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾2)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖).                                                                 (6)   
The mediating effect of high school dropout on welfare receipt is 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1, while the mediating 
effect of early life experiences (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) on welfare receipt is 𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1. The mediating effect of early 
life experiences (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) that operates through dropping out of high school is 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1. Finally, the 
overall effect of parental welfare participation on young people’s welfare receipt is the sum of 
the direct effect and these mediating effects: 𝛼𝛼1 +  𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1 +  𝛼𝛼4(𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1).  
 This framework allows the total mediating effect of dropping out of high school (given 
in the third term) to be decomposed into two components: i) the direct mediating effect of high 
school dropout on the relationship between parental welfare participation and youth welfare 
receipt (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1); and ii) the mediating effect of early life experiences on intergenerational welfare 
that operates through the failure to complete high school (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1). The latter sheds light on the 
extent to which early life experiences are the channels through which parental welfare 
 
29 This model has been used previously to study the relationship between early life conditions and health (Tubeuf 
et al. 2012) and the relationship between childhood homelessness and adult employment (Cobb-Clark & Zhu 
2017). We do not consider employment as an early-life experience because the relative timing of dropout and 
employment is less clear.  
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participation is linked to young people’s welfare receipt through the influence they have on the 
propensity to complete high school.30  
 The early life experiences (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) we consider include: i) risky behaviors; and ii) parenting 
practices (parenting style, parental support) as well as iii) the number of schools youths 
attended; iv) the number of houses youths lived in; v) an indicator for whether the youth was 
ever suspended or expelled from school; and vi) an indicator for whether the youth has been 
diagnosed with ADHD. Young people growing up in welfare-reliant families on average 
engage in more risky behavior, attend more schools, experience more residential moves, are 
more likely to have been suspended or expelled (13.3 pp.) and are more likely to have ADHD 
(2.2 pp.) (see Table 5). All of these have the potential to affect the chances of dropping out. 
Table 5 here 
 Complete mediation results from estimating the model in Equations (4)-(6) are presented 
in Appendix Tables B2 and B3, while our primary results are depicted in Figures 1–3. 
Specifically, we present our results as a series of bar graphs (one for each early life experience) 
which show the extent to which the intergenerational relationship in welfare receipt flows 
through: i) the direct mediating effect of early life experiences (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) (green); ii) the indirect 
mediating effect of early life experiences that operate through the failure to complete high 
school (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) (red); and iii) the direct mediating effect of high school dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) (blue). 
Together these three components capture the mediating effects of early life experiences and 
dropping out of high school on the intergenerational relationship in welfare receipt; the sum of 
the latter two represents the overall mediating effect of the failure to complete high school.31 
The top panel in each figure presents the results for the extensive margin (participation) of 
intergenerational welfare, while the bottom panel presents the results for the intensive (total 
benefits received in dollars).  
 
5.2.2 Early Educational Experiences 
We find that early educational experiences have important direct effects in mediating 
intergenerational welfare receipt; that is, they represent channels through which parental 
welfare receipt is being passed on to their adult children. Instability is one key channel. 
Children in welfare-reliant families attend more schools and live in more houses (see Table 5) 
 
30 Notice that Equation (6) can also be rewritten as: 𝛼𝛼1 + (𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3)𝛾𝛾1 +  𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1.  This allows us to decompose 
the overall mediating effect of early life experiences into i) a component that operates directly (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) and ii) a 
component that operates indirectly through dropping out of high school (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1).    
31 Similarly, the overall mediating effect of early life experiences is given by the sum of the first two components. 
The direct effect of parental welfare participation on young people’s welfare receipt (𝛼𝛼1) is constructed by 
subtracting the sum of all three mediating components from 100 percent. 
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and this increased instability matters. The number of schools attended (houses lived in) 
accounts for 4.7 (8.9) percent of the intergenerational relationship in welfare participation and 
6.5 (10.0) percent of the effect of parental welfare participation on the total welfare benefits (in 
dollars) that young people receive (shown in green Figure 1). School disciplinary actions 
constitute another key channel. Children in welfare-reliant families are twice as likely to ever 
have been suspended or expelled from school; fully, 9.5 (12.0) percent of the extensive 
(intensive) margin of intergenerational welfare receipt operates through this channel. Together, 
these results provide clear evidence that disruptions in young people’s schooling are one 
mechanism linking welfare receipt across generations. Interestingly, adolescents in welfare-
reliant families are also nearly twice as likely to have been diagnosed with ADHD, yet only 
1.8 percent of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt is due to the disparity in 
ADHD.    
Figure 1 here 
 The above are the direct mediating effects of early educational experiences; that is, they 
influence intergenerational welfare through some mechanism other than the failure to complete 
high school. Each also indirectly affects intergenerational welfare receipt through their effect 
on the decision to drop out from high school. We find, however, that these indirect mediating 
effects (shown in red in Figure 1) are more modest in the case of welfare participation – ranging 
from 0.7 percent (ADHD) to 4.1 percent (suspension/expulsion) – and are somewhat larger 
when we focus on the total dollars of welfare benefits that young people receive. Most notably, 
6.4 percent of the overall relationship between parents’ welfare participation and the total 
welfare support their young-adult children receive is due to the consequences of school 
suspension and expulsion in raising the chances that young people do not complete high school. 
 Early school experiences are important in helping us to understand the total mediating 
effect of the failure to complete high school on intergenerational welfare. This is particularly 
true in in the case of school discipline; more than a fifth of the overall effect of dropping out 
from high school stems from the indirect mediating role of school suspension and expulsion.32  
In short, children in welfare-reliant families are more likely than their peers to be suspended or 
expelled from school; this in turn is linked to a higher risk of dropping out of high school and, 
consequently, receiving welfare benefits themselves. These results are consistent with 
emerging evidence that strict school discipline policies have a negative effect in lowering 
student achievement (Craig & Martin 2019) and reducing educational attainment, while raising 
 
32 This can see seen in Figure 1 by calculating the ratio of the indirect mediating effect of early school experiences 
operating through dropping out (shown in red) to the overall mediating effect of dropout (the sum of the red and 
blue bars). 
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adult criminal activity (Backer-Hicks et al. 2019).  In contrast, only a negligible share (3.3 
percent) of the overall effect of dropping out of high school is due to the indirect role of ADHD.  
      
5.2.3 Risky Behaviors and Parenting 
Risk-taking behavior and dropping out of high school are the two most important pathways 
linking parents’ welfare experiences with those of their adult children (see Tables 3 and 4). For 
many young people these choices go hand in hand (e.g., Rumberger & Lim 2008; Wang & 
Fredricks 2014), raising questions about the extent to which the mediating role of dropping out 
of high school is, in fact, underpinned by adolescents’ decisions to consume illicit substances 
and engage in deviant or risky sexual behavior. Given the nature of the questions in the YIF 
survey and respondents’ ages, we believe that most of the risk-taking behaviors we analyze 
occurs before the decision to drop out of high school, leading us to analyze the mediating role 
of risky choices on the failure to complete high school. We cannot completely rule out, 
however, that the relationship operates the other way around. Given the descriptive nature of 
our analysis, this is not particularly troubling since we are not interested in isolating the causal 
effect of the two. Nonetheless, it is important to be circumspect when interpreting our results. 
 The mediating effects of risk-taking behavior on intergenerational welfare are presented 
in Figure 2.  Like early educational experiences, young people’s risk-related choices represent 
key pathways through which welfare is being transferred across generations. We first consider 
the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation (Panel A). Fully 20 percent of the 
overall mediating effect of dropping out of high school (16.1 percent) is due to the indirect 
effect of smoking on the chances of completing high school (3.4 percent), for example. In other 
words, parental welfare is associated with more smoking, which in turn is associated with a 
greater chance of dropping out of high school. Smoking also has a large (8.0 percent) direct 
mediating effect on intergenerational welfare participation that operates through channels other 
than high school completion. Delinquency has a similarly large effect, accounting for 24.1 
percent of the overall mediating effect of the failure to complete high school. In contrast, while 
illicit drug use and teenage pregnancy have measurable direct mediating effects on 
intergenerational welfare participation (3.9 and 5.6 percent respectively), neither contributes 
much to the overall mediating effect of dropping out of high school. 
Figure 2 here  
 Choices regarding risk-taking behavior and dropping out of high school are even more 
consequential for the intensive margin of intergenerational welfare receipt. Together they 
account for between 29.8 (illicit drug use) and 35.4 percent (delinquency) of the relationship 
between parents’ welfare participation and young people’s total welfare benefits. This is 
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perhaps not surprising given that total welfare benefits increase with the amount of time young 
people receive benefits capturing the extent of their socio-economic disadvantage. The relative 
importance of the various channels underpinning intergenerational welfare are similar, 
however, irrespective of whether we consider the extensive or intensive margin of welfare 
receipt. Smoking and delinquent behavior have both sizable direct mediating effects and 
comprise a large share of the overall mediating effects of dropping out of high school. Illicit 
drug use and teenage pregnancy, in contrast, have largely direct mediating effects.  
 Overall, between 9.9 (participation) and 16.1 percent (total welfare dollars) percent of 
the intergenerational relationship in welfare receipt stems from the parenting that young people 
receive – most importantly, the extent to which they receive financial support from their parents 
when they are aged 18 (see Tables 3 and 4). The results of our detailed mediating analysis 
confirm the relative importance of parents’ financial transfers and loans to their young adult 
children as a pathway in intergenerational welfare (see Figure 3). Overall, 14.4 percent of the 
overall mediating effect of the failure to complete high school on the intensive as well as the 
extensive margin of intergenerational welfare is due to disparities in the financial support 
provided to young people growing up in welfare- vs. non-welfare-reliant families. In contrast, 
there is virtually no mediating effect of differences in co-residence on intergenerational 
welfare. Similarly, despite the extensive evidence that socio-economic disadvantage is 
associated with less effective parenting styles (see Guo & Harris 2000; Cheng 2008), we do 
not find support for the hypothesis that parenting style – at least when measured by parental 
monitoring and respectful parent-child interactions – is the pathway through which 
intergenerational welfare receipt occurs.  
Figure 3 here 
 
5.2.4 Summary: The Direct Mediating Effect of the Failure to Complete High School 
Although many of the early life experiences we consider go some way towards explaining the 
mediating role of high school dropout in intergenerational welfare receipt, the direct effect of 
dropping out of high school remains large. Across all of the early life experiences, risky 
behaviors and parenting practices we consider, the direct effect of high school dropout ranges 
from 12.6 (delinquency) to 20.4 (ADHD) percent for the extensive margin of welfare receipt 
and from 18.6 (delinquency) to 30.7 (lives independently) percent for the intensive margin.33 
This substantial direct effect of failing to complete high school on intergenerational welfare 
 
33 Accounting for all mediating factors simultaneously results in a direct mediating effect of high school dropout 
on welfare participation (total welfare benefits) of 6.7 (11.5) percent, suggesting that even if we account for all 
possible mediators that the direct effect of high school remains.    
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receipt is not surprising given the strong relationship between high school graduation and labor 
market outcomes. At the same time, welfare may influence high school completion through 
other pathways (e.g., academic ability, grade retention, aspirations, language background, 
peers, school resources and policies, etc.) that we are unable to consider (see Rumberger & 
Lim 2008; De Witte et al. 2013).34      
 
5.2.5 High School Dropouts: The Motivation for Leaving School  
The circumstances leading adolescents to leave high school before graduating may have long-
term consequences. Table 6 presents an overview of the motivations – scaled from least [1] to 
most [5] important – that young people cite for dropping out of high school. Dropouts in 
welfare-reliant families are significantly more likely than dropouts from more advantaged 
families to say that leaving school was due to financial reasons, their poor behavior (getting 
into trouble or being expelled) or their school experiences (poor grades or unsatisfactory 
subject options). They are also less likely than dropouts from more advantaged backgrounds to 
report leaving school because they have a job/apprenticeship or because they do not need to 
complete grade 12 for their future career. On balance, disadvantaged dropouts appear to be 
leaving school under more adverse circumstances.  
Table 6 here 
 We consider the consequences of this for the correlation in intergenerational welfare by 
conditioning our estimation on high school dropouts (n = 934) and estimating our baseline 
model of welfare participation. Like our analysis of risk-taking behavior, parenting and health, 
we jointly consider all 12 reasons for dropping out using a single mediating vector. Results are 
presented in Table 7. There is clear evidence that, taken together, the reasons that young people 
have for dropping out of high school are both statistically significant and economically 
important; overall 40.5 percent of the intergenerational correlation in the intensive margin of 
intergenerational welfare receipt operates through the motivation for dropping out. More than 
a quarter (26.8 percent) of the correlation in intergenerational welfare participation among 
young people who fail to complete high school is attributable to poor academic performance 
(10.0 percent), being frequently in trouble in school (8.3 percent) or choosing a career path that 
does not require a 12th grade education (8. 5 percent). Interestingly, dropping out of high school 
to pursue a job or apprenticeship reduces the strength of the intergenerational welfare 
 
34 We provide results for attitudes and locus of control (Panel D) and health (Panel E) in Tables B3 and B4, 
respectively. We find that none these factors indirectly mediate intergenerational welfare receipt via their 
influence on dropping out of high school. In contrast, support for a generous welfare system does have a direct 
mediating effect on intergenerational welfare receipt.   
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correlation; though the effect is modest in size. Finally, there is no evidence that dropping out 
of high school as a result of parental advice, limited curriculum choice or friends dropping out 
mediates the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation.         
Table 7 here 
 
5.2.6 High School Graduates: University Entrance Scores 
One of the key strengths of our data is that we can isolate the effects of educational attainment 
from academic achievement. We conclude our analysis by investigating the role of academic 
achievement – as measured by university entrance scores – in the transmission of welfare 
across generations. Specifically, we consider whether – conditional on obtaining a high school 
degree and receiving a university entrance score – early school experiences, risk-taking 
behavior and parenting practices contribute to the mediating the role of university entrance 
scores themselves in intergenerational welfare receipt. To this end, we re-estimate the model 
in Equations (4)-(6) replacing our indicator of high school dropout with a continuous measure 
of students’ university entrance scores and conditioning the sample on high school completion 
and the receipt of an ATAR score.35  
 Selected results for the extensive welfare margin (participation) are presented in Figure 
5; complete mediation results can be found in Appendix Table B5.36 Parallel to Figures 1-3, 
each bar in Figure 5 shows the extent to which the intergenerational relationship in welfare 
participation flows through: i) the direct mediating effect of early life experiences (green); ii) 
the indirect mediating effect of early life experiences that operates through educational 
achievement (ATAR score) (red); and iii) the direct mediating effect of ATAR score (blue).  
Figure 5 here 
 With a few exceptions, most early life experiences do not have a direct mediating effect 
on intergenerational welfare participation once we condition on high school completion and 
the receipt of an ATAR score. In particular, for high-school graduates on the academic track, 
the direct mediating effects of suspensions, risky behaviors and financial support on 
intergenerational welfare are minimal (ranging from 0 to 1.9 percent) (shown in green, Figure 
5). This is in sharp contrast to their substantial mediating effect on the population of young 
 
35 The 23.4 percent of high school graduates who do not earn an ATAR score are also dropped from the sample. 
These students are typically on a vocational rather than academic track; thus, they do not earn an ATAR score. In 
results available on request we estimate the model in Equations (4)-(6) replacing dropout with whether or not the 
youth received an ATAR score and conditioning the sample on high school completion. Results largely mirror 
those for the ATAR score – very few mediators operate through obtaining an ATAR score.  
36 For brevity, we discuss the results for the extensive margin of welfare receipt only. Appendix Figure A1 presents 
results for the intensive margin and we note differences in results where necessary. Appendix Tables B5 and A8 
present the complete mediation results for all early life experiences (including attitudes, locus of control and 
health), and for both the extensive and intensive margins of welfare receipt, respectively.  
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people as a whole (see Figures 1-3). This indicates that – conditional on pursuing an academic 
curriculum and completing high school – these experiences are not the primary channels 
through which welfare participation is passed from parents to children. If young people 
successfully complete high school with a university entrance score, previous school 
suspensions, risky behavior and a lack of financial support from parents are no longer drivers 
of subsequent welfare participation. In contrast, school changes, residential mobility and co-
residency all have direct mediating effects on intergenerational welfare even among this 
selected sample of young people. Fully, 8.3 percent of the intergenerational correlation in 
welfare participation is explained by residential mobility; 4.9 percent operates through school 
changes, while 4.3 percent is explained by co-residence.  
 Unlike the case for educational attainment (high school completion), early life 
experiences do not have an indirect mediating effect on educational achievement. That is, early 
educational experiences, risk-taking behavior and parenting practices do not mediate 
intergenerational welfare participation through their effect on ATAR scores (conditional on 
receiving one).37 While school changes, residential mobility, smoking, delinquency and 
financial support, for example,  have sizable indirect mediating effects on young people as a 
whole that operate through dropping out of high school, there is no such mediating effect 
operating through ATAR scores themselves for those high school graduates who receive one.  
 Given we find no support for indirect mediating effects, it is not surprising that the direct 
mediating effect of the ATAR score on intergenerational welfare is similar in our detailed 
analysis to the results of our overview analysis. Specifically, the direct mediating effect of the 
ATAR score ranges from 4.8 to 6.4 percent in Figure 4 (shown in blue); compared to 5.7 percent 
in Table 3. Educational achievement has a relatively modest effect in mediating 
intergenerational welfare participation, especially when compared to the mediating effect of 
high school dropout. It is likely that ATAR scores are capturing the effects of university 
attendance on welfare receipt, given that ATAR scores above 70 generally grant access to 
university courses, while those with lower scores may struggle to find placement. Moreover, 
in Australia, high-performing students from low socio-economic backgrounds are not deterred 
from enrolling in university due to credit constraints as a result of the government’s higher 
education loan schemes (Cardak & Ryan 2006).  
 
 
 
37 The results in Appendix Table B4 confirm that this is also true for work-welfare attitudes, locus of control and 
health outcomes. There are also no indirect mediating effects when considering the intensive margin (see 
Appendix Figure A1 and Table B5). 
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6. Conclusions  
Any reduction in intergenerational welfare must ultimately come from reducing the persistence 
in socioeconomic position and increasing the opportunities for social mobility. This requires 
that we understand the pathways that result in intergenerational disadvantage and design 
effective policy solutions so that poor children do not become poor adults. Unfortunately, 
empirical studies of intergenerational welfare are scarce (Stenberg 2000), making it 
challenging to develop practical solutions that might lead to real progress.   
 Our research makes an important contribution by using unique survey-administrative 
data to study the welfare receipt of young people and their families over two decades. Using 
mediation analysis, we not only calculate the overall intergenerational correlation in welfare 
receipt, but also quantify the share of that correlation that operates through a broad range of 
diverse mechanisms. While some like educational attainment and risk-taking behavior have 
been the focus of previous studies, others including work-welfare attitudes, parenting and early 
school experiences are being empirically studied for the first time. Our analysis is descriptive; 
we do not identify causal results. Still, our results shed light on the drivers of economic 
opportunity, the likely channels through which intergenerational welfare receipt occurs and the 
best options for targeting resources towards supporting children in welfare-reliant families.    
 Our results lead us to several key conclusions. First, intergenerational persistence in 
economic disadvantage can largely be understood through an education lens. The single most 
important mechanism linking welfare across generations is the failure to complete high school. 
Welfare receipt is also transmitted from parents to their young-adult children through the 
curriculum choices and educational achievements of those who do complete high school. The 
critical role of education in intergenerational welfare receipt is perhaps not surprising given the 
theoretical importance of the complementarities between wealth and human capital production 
in intergenerational mobility (Becker et al. 2018) and previous evidence that the long-term 
effects of financial poverty operate through educational failure (Backman & Nilsson 2011) and 
the constraints that families experience in investing in their children’s acquisition of human 
capital (Rank & Cheng 1995).  
Second, early school experiences can have long-term consequences. Young people in 
welfare-reliant households are more likely to drop out of high school – and thus end up on the 
welfare rolls – in part because of disciplinary actions that disproportionately result in their 
suspension and expulsion from school. They also experience more residential mobility and 
school changes, both of which are directly linked to subsequent welfare receipt. In short, 
disruptions in adolescents’ schooling are clearly one mechanism linking welfare receipt across 
generations. It is also the case that welfare-reliant young people who fail to complete high 
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school appear to be leaving school under more adverse circumstances (e.g., being in trouble in 
school, poor academic performance, financial problems, etc.) than their more advantaged 
classmates who also leave school early. Crucially, young people’s motivation for leaving 
school matters; nearly half of the intergenerational correlation in intergenerational welfare 
receipt operates through the motivation for dropping out. 
 Third, educational outcomes for young people in welfare-reliant households are likely 
influenced by many things beyond their school experiences. Young people’s own risk-taking 
behavior (smoking, illicit drug use, delinquency and pregnancy), for example, is also a key 
mechanism underpinning intergenerational welfare reliance. Disadvantaged young people take 
more risks. This has both direct effects on the transmission of disadvantage across generations 
as well as an indirect effect which operates by increasing the likelihood of dropping out of high 
school. Disadvantage is also being perpetuated from one generation to the next through the 
parenting that young people receive.  The issue is not the style that parents adopt (i.e., warmth 
and monitoring), but rather the relative lack of support – particularly financial support – that 
welfare-reliant parents provide. Without adequate parental support, young people’s ability to 
successfully transition from education to employment may be constrained.   
Fourth, if our goal is to reduce intergenerational welfare, supporting educational 
attainment may be more important than supporting educational achievement. Unlike the case 
for educational attainment (high school completion), early educational experiences, risk-taking 
behavior and parenting practices do not have an indirect mediating effect on educational 
achievement (university entrance scores). Residential mobility, school changes, smoking, 
delinquency and parental financial support, for example, all have sizable indirect mediating 
effects on intergenerational welfare that operate through the failure to complete high school; 
but there is no such mediating effect operating through the university entrance scores of high 
school graduates who receive one. This is consistent with Danish evidence that parental welfare 
dependence negatively affects attainment (completing upper secondary school) but not 
achievement (grade point average) (Fallesen & Bernardi 2018). 
Finally, there is a great deal to be learned from the pathways that have either no or only 
a modest role in transmitting welfare receipt across generations. Specifically, parental welfare 
is not by and large transmitted to young people (age 23 – 26) through their physical and mental 
health, work experience, locus of control and work-welfare attitudes at age 18. Given the 
international evidence that welfare reliance and poverty more generally have consequences for 
children’s physical and mental health (see Brooks-Gunn & Duncan 1997; Spady et al. 2001), 
we cannot completely rule out the possibility that any health consequences for young people’s 
welfare receipt may only become evident as they mature into middle- and old-age. 
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Additionally, although the effect of attitudes in driving intergenerational welfare is not zero; it 
is best described as modest. This is at odds with cultural explanations of intergenerational 
welfare which attribute welfare dependency to the values that children acquire from their 
parents and neighbors (see Duncan et al., 1988; Patterson, 1986; Bartholomae et al., 2004).  
 Taken together, our results present a clear focus for policy action; schools, communities 
and governments must find better ways to support the education of children in welfare-reliant 
families. Along with education reform, there may also be benefits from tackling the issue 
through reforms of the welfare system itself. U.S. welfare reform, for example, narrowed the 
income gap in high school dropout rate by 20 percent (Miller & Zhang 2012), while Dutch 
policy reforms that tightened disability insurance eligibility criteria for some claimants, 
increased the education of children whose parents were subject to the reform (Dahl & Gielen 
2018). Similarly, the importance of parental financial support in transmitting disadvantage 
across generations calls into question the wisdom of Australian policies that increasingly shift 
the financial burden of supporting young people from the public purse to their families.38  Such 
policies are likely to increase the salience of parents’ co-residential and financial support as a 
mechanism underpinning intergenerational welfare receipt.  
 The value of our mediation model lies in its ability to identify the drivers of economic 
opportunity by quantifying the likely channels through which intergenerational welfare receipt 
is occurring and identifying the options for better targeting resources. It is a descriptive 
analysis. Future research will be needed to determine whether any – and if so which ones – of 
the various mechanisms we have identified are likely to be causal. Identifying causal mediating 
factors is empirically demanding (see Imai et al. 2010; Hicks & Tingley 2011; Mendolia & 
Siminski 2017) and each potential factor will need to be examined separately. There is no 
guarantee that if one particular mechanism is found to be causal (or not) others will be as well. 
Identifying causal mechanisms would expand the set of policy leavers available to address 
intergenerational disadvantage.  
  
 
38 Maas (1990) argues that changes to the social safety net in the late 1980s which set lower unemployment benefit 
levels for those under the age of 21 contributed to the financial dependency of young people.  The introduction of 
Youth Allowance in 1998 and the expansion of the parental income test mean that parental income increasingly 
determines whether young adults receive social assistance (Smyth 2000). See Cobb-Clark (2008) and Buckmaster 
(2011) for reviews.  
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Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1: Australian welfare eligibility conditions 
Benefit Eligibility Age  eligibility 
Activity 
tested  
Disability Support Pension 
(DSP) 
Permanent diagnosed disability 16 to 
pension 
age 
No Attended program support and cannot work for >15h/week for 2 
years 
Carer Payment 
(CP) 
In constant daily care for a person 
with severe disability/illness OR 
who is frail aged none 
No 
Care in private home for ≥6 months 
and spend no more than 25h/week 
away from caring 
No 
Parenting Payment Single 
(PPS) 
Principal carer of ≥1 child who is 
≤8years old  none Yes 
Parenting Payment Partnered 
(PPP) 
Principal carer of ≥1 child who is <6years old  none Yes 
Newstart Allowance 
(NA) 
Unemployed, looking for work, and 
willing to work 
22 to 
pension 
age 
Yes 
Youth Allowance Jobseeker 
(YAJ) 
Looking for full time work or doing 
approved activities 16 to 22 Yes 
Source: Income Support Payment Description, Australian Department of Human Services, presenting a 
snapshot of eligibility conditions in 2019. For the observation window of parental payments from 1996 to 2006, 
two differences are worth pointing out: Until 2006, the condition for DSP eligibility was inability to work for 
>30h/week (rather than 15), and the child’s age threshold was 16 (rather than 6 or 8) years for both PPP and 
PPS eligibility.  
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Table 2. Youth welfare receipt and mediating variables conditional on parental welfare 
participation.  
  Parental welfare participation    
  None Any Difference 
Youth welfare receipt (age 23-26)       
Any participation  0.201 0.379 0.178*** 
Total dollars  2920.852 8511.899 5591.047*** 
Sample (N) 1530 2386   
Mediatorsa       
Dropout  0.208 0.391 0.183*** 
Obtaining an ATARb 0.840 0.716 -0.124*** 
ATAR scorec 74.427 70.531 -3.896*** 
Smoker 0.110 0.212 0.101*** 
Drug use (std) -0.139 0.095 0.234*** 
Delinquency (std) -0.190 0.126 0.316*** 
Pregnancy 0.025 0.076 0.051*** 
Respectful parenting (std) 0.063 -0.052 -0.115*** 
Monitoring parenting (std) 0.149 -0.117 -0.266*** 
Lives independently 0.139 0.219 0.080*** 
Financial support 0.778 0.618 -0.160*** 
Benefits too low 0.384 0.504 0.120*** 
Govt's responsibility 0.426 0.485 0.058*** 
Ambition important 0.761 0.740 -0.021 
Depression 0.141 0.182 0.042*** 
Health limits work  0.059 0.083 0.024*** 
Obesity 0.055 0.074 0.019** 
Physical exercise  3.933 3.822 -0.110** 
Employed 0.929 0.896 -0.033*** 
Locus of control (std) 0.062 -0.013 -0.074** 
Notes: We present the results of t-test for significant differences in the weighted means. *, **, *** represents 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
a The sample size is not consistent across the different mediators.  
b The sample for obtaining an ATAR (university entrance rank) is conditional on high school completion.  
c The sample for ATAR score is conditional on receiving a score.  
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Table 3. Overview of the factors mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental 
and youth welfare participation – Extensive margin.   
 Overall (coeff) 
Direct 
(coeff) 
Mediating 
(coeff) 
Mediating /  
Overall (%) Sample 
Conditional intergenerational 
correlation  
0.120***    3826 
(0.0164)     
Education      
   Dropout  0.121*** 0.094*** 0.027*** 22.00 3698 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.004)   
   Obtaining an ATARa 0.087*** 0.076*** 0.011*** 12.89 2531 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.003)    
   ATAR scoreb 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.005** 5.69 1785 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.002)   
Risky behaviorsǂ  0.130*** 0.106*** 0.024*** 18.64 2813 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.005)   
   Smoker    0.009*** 7.07  
   (0.003)   
   Drug use (std)    0.001 0.74  
   (0.001)   
   Delinquency (std)    0.007*** 5.54  
   (0.003)   
   Pregnancy    0.007*** 5.29  
   (0.002)   
Parentingǂ 0.139*** 0.125*** 0.014*** 9.86 2761 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.003)   
   Respectful parenting (std)     0.001 0.46  
   (0.001)   
   Monitoring parenting (std)   0.003* 2.02  
   (0.002)   
   Lives independently     0.003* 2.26  
   (0.002)   
   Financial support     0.007*** 5.12  
   (0.003)   
Attitudesǂ  0.127*** 0.118*** 0.008*** 6.37 3378 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.002)   
   Benefits too low     0.006*** 4.73  
   (0.002)   
   Govt's responsibility     0.001 1.08  
   (0.001)   
   Ambition important     0.001 0.56  
   (0.001)   
Healthǂ  0.122*** 0.114*** 0.007** 6.07 2661 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.004)   
   Depression     0.002 1.85  
   (0.002)   
   Health limits work      0.003 2.74  
   (0.002)   
   Obesity     0.001 0.50  
   (0.001)   
   Physical exercise      0.001 0.98  
   (0.001)   
Employed 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.004** 3.29 3823 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.002)   
Locus of control (std) 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.002 1.16 2825 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.002)   
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Notes: Regression estimates of the baseline model outlined in Equations (1)-(3) underly these results. Youth 
welfare receipt is captured by welfare participation over the ages 23-26. Each regression includes the following 
control variables: sex, state of residence, whether they lived with both parents at age 14, and whether their mother 
was employed at age 14. Selected coefficient estimates from Equation (2) relating to this table are presented in 
Appendix Table B1. The direct plus mediating effect equals the overall effect coefficient (subject to rounding). 
Standard errors presented in parentheses, for the mediating effect standard errors are bootstrapped (400 replications 
and sampled with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent levels respectively.  
ǂ For these channels, we include a vector of mediators in Equation (1), rather than a single mediator variable. 
a The sample for obtaining an ATAR (university entrance rank) is conditional on high school completion.  
b The sample for ATAR score is conditional on receiving a score. 
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Table 4. Overview of the factors mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental 
welfare participation and youth total dollars of welfare – Intensive margin.   
 Overall (coeff) 
Direct 
(coeff) 
Mediating 
(coeff) 
Mediating /  
Overall (%) Sample 
Conditional intergenerational 
correlation  
3.874***    3826 
(0.510)     
Education      
   Dropout  3.271*** 2.187*** 1.085*** 33.16 3698 
 (0.522) (0.502) (0.168)    
   Obtaining an ATARa 2.258*** 1.758*** 0.500*** 22.15 2531 
  (0.439) (0.434) (0.110)     
   ATAR scoreb 1.279*** 1.136*** 0.143*** 11.16 1785 
  (0.369) (0.368) (0.059)    
Risky behaviorsǂ  3.558*** 2.647*** 0.911*** 25.60 2813 
  (0.582) (0.557) (0.183)    
   Smoker   0.350*** 9.84  
   (0.102)    
   Drug use (std)   -0.023 -0.65  
   (0.042)    
   Delinquency (std)   0.325*** 9.13  
   (0.109)    
   Pregnancy   0.259*** 7.27  
   (0.094)    
Parentingǂ 3.667*** 3.077*** 0.589*** 16.07 2761 
 (0.583) (0.578) (0.134)    
   Respectful parenting (std)   0.039 1.06  
   (0.036)    
   Monitoring parenting (std)   0.087* 2.37  
   (0.051)    
   Lives independently   0.128** 3.48  
   (0.065)    
   Financial support   0.336*** 9.16  
   (0.093)    
Attitudesǂ  3.324*** 3.130*** 0.194*** 5.83 3378 
 (0.533) (0.532) (0.071)    
   Benefits too low   0.141*** 4.23  
   (0.054)    
   Govt's responsibility   0.024 0.71  
   (0.023)    
   Ambition important   0.029 0.89  
   (0.037)    
Healthǂ  3.186*** 2.893*** 0.293** 9.20 2661 
 (0.569) (0.554) (0.149)    
   Depression   0.093 2.91  
   (0.077)    
   Health limits work    0.132 4.16  
   (0.093)    
   Obesity   0.051 1.59  
   (0.040)    
   Physical exercise    0.017 0.54  
   (0.026)    
Employed 3.281*** 3.119*** 0.162** 4.95 3823 
  (0.515) (0.509) (0.083)    
Locus of control (std) 3.550*** 3.486*** 0.065 1.82 2825 
  (0.581) (0.572) (0.103)    
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Notes: Regression estimates of the baseline model outlined in Equations (1)-(3) underly these results. Youth 
welfare receipt is captured by the amount ($’000) of welfare the youth received over the ages 23-26. Each 
regression includes the following control variables: sex, state of residence, whether they lived with both parents at 
age 14, and whether their mother was employed at age 14. Selected coefficient estimates from Equation (2) relating 
to this table are presented in Appendix Table B1. The direct plus mediating effect equals the overall effect 
coefficient (subject to rounding). Standard errors presented in parentheses, for the mediating effect standard errors 
are bootstrapped (400 replications and sampled with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.  
ǂ For these channels, we include a vector of mediators in Equation (1), rather than a single mediator variable.  
a The sample for obtaining an ATAR (university entrance rank) is conditional on high school completion.  
b The sample for ATAR score is conditional on receiving a score. 
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Table 5. Youth welfare receipt and additional mediating variables conditional on parental 
welfare participation. 
  Parental welfare participation    
  None Any Difference 
Early-life experiences        
Number of schools 2.795 3.433 0.638*** 
Number of houses 3.296 5.163 1.866*** 
Suspended/expelled 0.138 0.271 0.133*** 
ADHD 0.028 0.050 0.022*** 
Notes: We present the results of t-test for significant differences in the weighted means. *, **, *** represents 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 6. Self-reported reasons for high school dropout by parental welfare participation. 
  Parental welfare    
Reasons for high school dropout None Yes Difference 
Job/apprenticeship 3.998 3.790 -0.208* 
Not doing well in school 2.361 2.737 0.376*** 
Financial reasons 1.601 1.913 0.313*** 
Teachers thought you should leave 1.803 1.898 0.094 
Parents thought you should leave 1.812 1.563 -0.249*** 
Wanted to earn own money 3.584 3.676 0.092 
No subjects/courses you wanted offered 2.303 2.533 0.230** 
Friends did not do 12th Grade 1.635 1.697 0.062 
Health 1.606 1.628 0.023 
Expelled 1.219 1.393 0.174** 
High school degree not needed for career 3.064 2.642 -0.422*** 
Often in trouble at school 2.020 2.377 0.356*** 
Notes: Sample of respondents who dropped out of high school, N = 969. Each respondent who dropped out of high 
school is asked to rate how important each reason was in their decision to leave school before completing high 
school. Each reason is scaled from [1] not important to [5] very important. Sampling weights provided in the YIF 
data are applied. t-test of significant difference. *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels. 
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Table 7. The reasons for high school dropout mediating the intergenerational correlation 
between parental and youth welfare participation.   
 Overall (coeff) 
Direct 
(coeff) 
Mediating 
(coeff) 
Mediating /  
Overall (%) 
Reasons for Dropout  0.094*** 0.056 0.038*** 40.52 (0.040) (0.039) (0.014)   
Job/apprenticeship   -0.004 -3.99 
    (0.004)   
Not doing well in school   0.009* 9.99 
    (0.005)   
Financial reasons   0.006 6.82 
    (0.004)   
Teachers thought you should leave   0.002 2.11 
    (0.003)   
Parents thought you should leave   -0.000 -0.08 
    (0.001)   
Wanted to earn own money   0.004 3.91 
    (0.004)   
No subjects/courses you wanted offered   0.000 0.34 
    (0.003)   
Friends did not do 12th Grade   0.000 0.28 
    (0.001)   
Health   0.000 0.39 
    (0.003)   
Expelled   0.004 3.98 
    (0.004)   
High school degree not needed for career   0.008 8.52 
    (0.005)   
Often in trouble at school   0.008 8.25 
    (0.005)   
Notes: Sample of respondents who dropped out of high school, N = 934. Regression estimates of the baseline 
model outlined in Equations (1)-(3) underly these results. Each regression includes the following control variables: 
sex, state of residence, whether they lived with both parents at age 14, and whether their mother was employed at 
age 14. The direct plus mediating effect equals the overall effect coefficient (subject to rounding). Standard errors 
presented in parentheses, for the mediating effect standard errors are bootstrapped (400 replications and sampled 
with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels respectively. 
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Figure 1. Mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental welfare participation 
and youth welfare receipt – Early educational experiences operating through high school 
dropout.   
Panel A. Youth welfare participation (extensive margin) 
 
Panel B. Youth total dollars of welfare (intensive margin) 
 
Notes: Mediation results are based on regression estimates of Equations (4)-(6). The direct mediating effect of 
early life experiences (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) is in green; the indirect mediating effect of early life experiences that operates 
through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) is in red; and the direct mediating effect of dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) is in blue. The direct effect 
of parental welfare participation on youth welfare receipt is 100 minus the total mediating effect. Underlying 
results and statistical significance of the mediating effects are presented in Appendix Table B2 and B3, Panel A. 
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Figure 2. Mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental welfare participation 
and youth welfare receipt – Risky behavior mediators operating through high school dropout.   
Panel A. Youth welfare participation (extensive margin) 
 
Panel B. Youth total dollars of welfare (intensive margin) 
 
Notes: Mediation results are based on regression estimates of Equations (4)-(6). The direct mediating effect of 
early life experiences (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) is in green; the indirect mediating effect of early life experiences that operates 
through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) is in red; and the direct mediating effect of dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) is in blue. The direct effect 
of parental welfare participation on youth welfare receipt is 100 minus the total mediating effect. Underlying 
results and statistical significance of the mediating effects are presented in Appendix Table B2 and B3, Panel B.  
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Figure 3. Mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental welfare participation 
and youth welfare receipt – Parenting mediators operating through high school dropout.    
Panel A. Youth welfare participation (extensive margin) 
 
Panel B. Youth total dollars of welfare (intensive margin)  
 
 
Notes: Mediation results are based on regression estimates of Equations (4)-(6). The direct mediating effect of 
early life experiences (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) is in green; the indirect mediating effect of early life experiences that operates 
through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) is in red; and the direct mediating effect of dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) is in blue. The direct effect 
of parental welfare participation on youth welfare receipt is 100 minus the total mediating effect. Underlying 
results and statistical significance of the mediating effects are presented in Appendix Table B2 and B3, Panel C. 
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Figure 4. Mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental welfare participation 
and youth welfare participation – Early-life experiences operating through ATAR score. 
Panel A. Early educational experiences 
 
Panel B. Risky behaviors  
 
 Panel C. Parenting  
 
Notes: Note the scale change from Figures 1-3. Mediation results are based on regression estimates of Equations 
(4)-(6), replacing dropout with the ATAR score. The direct mediating effect of early life experiences (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) is in 
green; the indirect mediating effect of early life experiences that operates through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) is in red; 
and the direct mediating effect of ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) is in blue. The direct effect of parental welfare participation 
on youth welfare receipt is 100 minus the total mediating effect. Underlying results and statistical significance of 
the mediating effects are presented in Appendix Table B5. 
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Online Appendix  
 
A. Data Appendix 
Process of selecting mediating variables and constructs:  
• First, based on our theoretical framework and the data available in the YIF, we created 
variables that could be thought of as mediators and that could be grouped into 
underlying latent factors. The underlying factors we had in mind were: health; attitudes; 
locus of control; parenting; independence; financial support; risky behaviors; 
education; and employment. Locus of control and parenting are constructed based on 
previous research.   
• Second, we ran predictive models (OLS) of all (40) mediating variables only on youth 
welfare participation between ages 23-26 to see if each mediating variable was actually 
predictive of our key outcome. Majority of our mediating variables were predictive of 
youths’ welfare use with the following exceptions: asthma, importance of education, 
importance of own job, and risky alcohol consumption levels (based on 2009  NHRMC 
guidelines). These eventually are excluded from the analysis and are not considered a 
potential pathway since there is no explanatory power in them predicting youth welfare 
participation anyway. 
• Third, we investigated the underlying correlation among these mediating variables 
using exploratory and confirmatory principal component analyses (PCA). Only 
components with an eigenvalue greater than one were considered and components were 
rotated (oblimax) to facilitate interpretation. We find:  
o Majority of the mediating variables loaded onto components that were easily 
interpretable: mental health, attitudes to welfare, education, instability (moving 
houses/schools), independence, and parental financial support.  
o For some of the underlying constructs that we had in mind, the mediating 
variables loaded onto separate components (risky behaviors, remaining health 
constructs), suggesting that these variables were detecting underlying constructs 
that were more complex than we originally thought.  
o Some mediating variables loaded in an inconsistent way across components: 
health limiting work, physical exercise, ever employed, suspended or expelled 
from school. 
• Fourth, given we confirmed most of our mediating variables were loading on 
components that seemed to make sense, we went forth in creating variables that identify 
the broad pathways (from either further confirmatory PCAs or examining variable 
distributions): 
o Health:  
 Mental health is a single construct (diagnosed and/or treated). 
 Health limiting work is also a separate construct (could be either 
physical or mental). 
 ADHD is a learning disability (likely to flow through to educational 
attainment). 
 Physical exercise and obesity are included as separate variables.  
 Asthma is related to SES but in a non-linear way (low SES more likely 
to have asthma but higher SES more likely to have been diagnosed) and 
not related to youths’ welfare use, and thus excluded. 
o Attitudes: 
 Two measures not predictive of youths’ welfare use (importance of own 
educ / own job), and thus excluded.  
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 Three remaining attitude measures load on 2 separate components, so 
we keep these attitude measures separate: attitudes towards welfare and 
importance of own ambition.  
o Independence:  
 High correlation between our 2 measures, therefore retain whether they 
live independently or not.  
o Financial support: 
 When controlling for: i) any support, ii) amount of support, and iii) 
whether support was a gift, we find only whether support was had or not 
is predictive of youths’ welfare use. Thus, we retain only that measure.  
o Risky behaviors: 
 Conducted a PCA, and find support for 3 components: Smoking, drugs, 
and delinquent behaviors. For smoking variables, we find smoking often 
is the strongest predictor of youth’s welfare use and decide to retain that 
one indicator variable (rather than construct a factor score). We 
construct PCA factor scores for the other two components; drugs and 
delinquent behaviors (we have decided that pregnancy does not fit well 
with the concept of delinquent behaviors, so we examine this variable 
separately). 
 We also forced the PCA to produce loadings for 1 component, only to 
be used in the broad overview analysis.  
o Education  
 Both dropout and university entrance scores load on a single component, 
we retain them as separate education measures for the analysis.  
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Table A1. Variable definitions.  
Variable name Definition  
Youth welfare receipt (TDS data) 
Youth welfare 
participation   
=1 if youth received any income support payments between the ages of 23-26. Here, and 
throughout, we classify the following payments as Income Support: Carer Payment, 
Disability Pension Support, Newstart, Parenting Payment (Partnered), Parenting 
Payment (Single), and Youth Allowance (Jobseeker). 
Total dollars The total amount of support received over the ages 23-26.  
Parental welfare participation (TDS data) 
 =1 if parent (primary caregiver with longest duration of care) received any income 
support payments while the youth was aged between 8–15.  
Mediators (YIF data) 
Note: YIF variables are measured at age 18 years old (or before age 18), unless otherwise stated. 
Dropout =1 if youth did not complete high school with a Year 12 (high school) certificate.  
Obtaining an ATAR =1 if youth obtained a university entrance rank (Australian Tertiary Admission Rank, 
ATAR), conditional on completing high school. Those who do not complete high school 
are coded as missing.  
ATAR score The youth’s university entrance rank (ATAR), ranges from 30–99.99 for those who 
obtained a university entrance rank. Those who did not receive an ATAR are coded as 
missing.  
Unlike other states and territories, Queensland ranks students on a scale from 1 (highest) 
to 25 (lowest). Following Cardak and Ryan (2006), we transform scores for students in 
Queensland to be equivalent to those in other jurisdictions so that our university entrance 
rankings are calibrated to a common, Australia-wide scale that ranges from 30 to 99.99.  
Smoker =1 if youth currently smokes often (i.e., at least weekly).  
Drug use For our measures of risky behaviors, we perform a PCA using the following binary 
indicators that equal 1 if youth:  
i) ever tried marijuana (drug);  
ii) tried marijuana before age 15 (drug);  
iii) used marijuana monthly in the past year (drug); 
iv) ever started using illicit drugs (drug);   
v) ever had problems with alcohol (delinquent); 
vi) ever got into trouble with the police (delinquent);  
vii) ever attended child/juvenile court due to juvenile offending (delinquent);  
viii) ever ran away from home (delinquent);  
ix) ever started hanging around with a bad crowd (delinquent);  
We find support for two components:  ‘Drug use’ and ‘Delinquency’. From this we 
produce two component scores, which we standardize to be mean 0, standard deviation 
1.  
Delinquency  See ‘Drug user’.  
Pregnancy =1 if youth has ever been pregnant or got someone pregnant.  
Respectful parenting We follow Cobb-Clark et al. (2019) to construct similar measures parenting styles. 
Youth’s responses to the following constructs are used in a PCA (unlike Cobb-Clark et 
al. we exclude one mother-reported item to retain sample size):   
i) Mother respects my views and opinions (respect);  
ii) Mother's behavior towards me is friendly (respect); 
iii) Mother wants to know whereabouts (monitoring); 
iv) Mother really knows whereabouts (monitoring). 
Responses range from 1 (always true) to 6 (never true) for constructs i) and ii). 
Constructs iii) and iv) are constructed from responses to 6 items regarding how much 
the youth’s mother knows/wants to know about their whereabouts (see Cobb-Clark et 
al. for details). We form a continuous scale from 1 to 9, increasing in how much the 
mother knows/wants to know.  
We then perform a PCA on these four constructs to produce two components: 
‘Respectful parenting’ and ‘Monitoring parenting’. Each component is increasing in the 
degree of respect/monitoring and is standardized to have a mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. 
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Monitoring 
parenting 
See Respectful parenting. 
Lives independent =1 if youth lives independently (i.e., with no parental guardian). 
Financial support =1 if parents or anyone else assisted the youth financially in the last 12 months.  
Benefits too low =1 if youth believes that ‘benefits for unemployed people are too low and cause 
hardship’. 
Govt’s respons. =1 if youth believes that it is ‘mainly the governments’ responsibility for ensuring that 
people have enough to live on if they become unemployed. 
Ambition important =1 if youth believes their own ambition is extremely important for getting ahead in life. 
Depression  =1 if youth has ever been told by a health professional that they suffer from depression 
or anxiety OR if they have been treated for a mental or emotional issue.  
Health limits work =1 if health limits (or would limit) the amount of work youth could do. 
Obesity  =1 if youth is obese (any class) or morbid obese. (BMI≥30) 
Physical exercise  Frequency of moderate or intensive physical activity for at least 30 minutes, scaled from 1 to 6 
(‘Not at all’ to ‘Every day’).  
Employed  =1 if youth has ever been employed.  
Locus of control Based on the Pearlin and Schooler (1978) Mastery Scale, we measure youth’s sense of 
control over life’s events and what happens to them using responses to the following 
items:  
i) There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have; 
ii) Sometimes I feel that I’m being pushed around in life; 
iii) I have little control over the things that happen to me; 
iv) I can do just about anything I really set my mind to; 
v) I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life; 
vi) What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me; 
vii) There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life. 
Responses range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). All items (except iv. 
and vi.) are reverse coded such that items are increasing in the degree of control (i.e., 
increasing in internality). PCA confirms all items load on a single component, a 
component score is predicted and standardized to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1.   
Early-life Experience Mediators: 
ADHD =1 if youth has ever been told by a health professional that they have attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder.  
Suspend/expelled =1 if youth has ever been suspended or expelled from school. 
Number of schools The number of schools the youth has attended. 
Number of houses The number of houses the youth has lived in. 
Controls   
Sex =1 if the youth is a male.  
State  Indicators for the youth’s state of residence. There are 8 states [NSW; VIC; QLD; SA; 
WA; TAS; NT; ACT]. 
Live w/ parents (age 
14) 
=1 if youth lived with both parents (or guardians) at age 14.  
Mother emp. (age 
14) 
=1 if mother worked in a job, in her business or on a farm when youth was 14 years old. 
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Table A2. Summary statistics.   
Variable  Mean SD Sample 
Youth welfare receipt (age 23-26)       
Any participation  0.286 0.452 3916 
Total dollars  5598.834 13571.1 3916 
Parental welfare participation (youth aged 8-15)       
Any participation  0.479 0.5 3916 
Mediators       
Dropout 0.295 0.456 3788 
Obtaining an ATARa 0.789 0.408 2578 
ATAR scoreb 73.026 17.736 1810 
Smoker 0.155 0.362 2876 
Drug use (std) -0.035 0.966 2868 
Delinquency (std) -0.05 0.948 2868 
Pregnancy 0.048 0.214 2892 
Respectful parenting (std) 0.012 0.979 2791 
Monitoring parenting (std) 0.031 0.974 2791 
Lives independently 0.177 0.382 3916 
Financial support 0.701 0.458 3916 
Benefits too low 0.441 0.497 3587 
Govt's responsibility 0.454 0.498 3723 
Ambition important 0.751 0.433 3916 
Depression 0.161 0.367 3916 
Health limits work  0.071 0.256 3894 
Obesity 0.064 0.245 3688 
Physical exercise  3.884 1.412 2874 
Employed 0.913 0.282 3913 
Locus of control (std) 0.029 0.992 2876 
Additional mediators        
ADHD 0.039 0.193 3906 
Suspended or expelled 0.202 0.401 3911 
Number of schools 3.1 1.953 3916 
Number of houses 4.184 3.722 3864 
Controls       
Male 0.51 0.5 3916 
Youth's state of residence 2.6 1.601 3916 
[1] NSW (%) 30.26   1185 
[2] VIC (%) 26.277   1029 
[3] QLD (%) 20.608   807 
[4] SA (%) 7.865   308 
[5] WA (%) 9.908   388 
[6] TAS (%) 3.32   130 
[7] NT (%) 0.306   12 
[8] ACT (%) 1.456   57 
Lived w/ both parents (age 14)  0.723 0.448 3905 
Mother employed (at age 14)  0.686 0.464 3833 
Notes: All welfare variables are derived from the TDS data. Mediating and control variables are derived from the 
YIF data and are measured at or before age 18. Sampling weights provided in the YIF data are applied.  
a The sample for obtaining an ATAR (university entrance rank) is conditional on high school completion.  
b The sample for ATAR score is conditional on receiving a score. 
  
55 
 
B. Additional Results  
Table B1. The effect of parental welfare participation on each mediator, separately: Estimates 
of Equation (2).  
 Dropout 
Obtaining an 
ATARa ATAR scoreb Employed 
Parental welfare participation 0.115*** -0.106*** -2.969*** -0.022** 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.881) (0.011) 
R-squared  0.081 0.078 0.067 0.025 
Sample  3698 2531 1785 3823 
 Smoker 
Drug use 
(std) 
Delinquency 
(std) Pregnancy 
Parental welfare participation 0.058*** 0.092** 0.190*** 0.027*** 
  (0.016) (0.041) (0.041) (0.010) 
R-squared  0.025 0.013 0.045 0.031 
Sample  3823 2825 2813 2813 
 
Respectful 
parenting (std) 
Monitoring 
parenting (std) 
Lives 
independently 
Financial 
support 
Parental welfare participation -0.050 -0.119*** 0.030* -0.112*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.016) (0.019) 
R-squared 0.017 0.057 0.040 0.043 
Sample  2761 2761 2761 2761 
 
Benefits too 
low 
Govt's 
responsibility 
Ambition 
important 
Locus of 
control (std) 
Parental welfare participation 0.072*** 0.033* -0.014 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.041) 
R-squared 0.020 0.030 0.004 0.013 
Sample  3378 3378 3378 2825 
 Depression 
Health limits 
work Obesity 
Physical 
exercise 
Parental welfare participation 0.020 0.017 0.019* -0.078 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.059) 
R-squared 0.038 0.014 0.006 0.035 
Sample  2661 2661 2661 2661 
 
Notes: These regressions underlie part of the mediation results in Tables 3 and 4, specifically each cell represents 
the effect of parental welfare participation on each mediator from estimates of Equation (2). Each regression 
includes the following control variables: sex, state of residence, whether they lived with both parents at age 14, 
and whether their mother was employed at age 14 and a constant. *, **, *** represents statistical significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.  
a The sample for obtaining an ATAR (university entrance rank) is conditional on high school completion.  
b The sample for ATAR score is conditional on receiving a score.  
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Table B2. Multi-level mediation model results of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt – Extensive margin, Dropout. 
 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
Panel A. Early educational experiences: Num of schools Num of houses Suspended/Expelled ADHD 
Intergenerational correlation 0.121***   0.117***   0.121***   0.121***  
  (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.006*** 4.72 0.010*** 8.93 0.011*** 9.52 0.002 1.81 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.001)   
Mediator through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0.002*** 1.43 0.003*** 2.7 0.005*** 4.12 0.001* 0.7 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.024*** 19.68 0.022*** 18.9 0.018*** 14.93 0.025*** 20.41 
 (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.090*** 74.17 0.081*** 69.47 0.086*** 71.42 0.094*** 77.08 
(0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
Sample 3698   3650   3693   3690  
Panel B. Risky behavior mediators:  Smoker Drug use Delinquency Pregnancy 
Intergenerational correlation 0.132***   0.131***   0.131***   0.130***   
  (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.019)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.011*** 7.99 0.005*** 3.89 0.011*** 8.26 0.007*** 5.57 
 (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.003)   
Mediator through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 
 
0.004*** 3.36 0.002*** 1.61 0.005*** 3.97 0.002*** 1.64 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.017*** 12.72 0.021*** 15.73 0.017*** 12.64 0.021*** 16.46 
 (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.005)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 
 
0.100*** 75.93 0.103*** 78.77 0.099*** 75.13 0.100*** 76.33 
(0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   
Sample 2749   2741   2741   2764   
Panel C. Parenting mediators: Respectful Monitoring Lives independent Financial support 
Intergenerational correlation 0.141***   0.141***   0.121***   0.121***  
  (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.017)   (0.017)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.000 0.29 0.003* 2.04 0.003** 2.46 0.003* 2.85 
 (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
Mediator through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0.000 0.23 0.002*** 1.21 0.001** 0.82 0.004*** 3.11 
(0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
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 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.026*** 18.35 0.024*** 16.91 0.025*** 20.34 0.022*** 18.46 
 (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.004)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.114*** 81.13 0.112*** 79.84 0.093*** 76.39 0.092*** 75.58 
(0.019)   (0.019)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
Sample 2686   2686   3698   3698  
Panel D. Attitudes & LOC mediators: Benefits too low Govt’s respons. Ambition important Locus of Control 
Intergenerational correlation 0.127***   0.123***   0.121***   0.132***   
  (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.019)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.007*** 5.64 0.002 1.30 0.000 0.17 0.001 0.81 
 (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
Mediator through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 -0.06 -0.000 -0.08 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.16 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.026*** 20.59 0.029*** 23.22 0.026*** 21.78 0.025*** 18.90 
 (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.094*** 73.83 0.093*** 75.57 0.094*** 78.00 0.105*** 80.14 
 (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.018)   
Sample 3384   3522   3698   2749  
Panel E. Health mediators:  Depression Health limits work Obesity Physical exercise  
Intergenerational correlation 0.121***   0.118***   0.117***   0.132***   
  (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.019)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.001 1.19 0.002 1.76 0.001 1.00 0.001 1.02 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Mediator through dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0.000 0.31 0.000 0.33 0.000 0.17 0.000 0.12 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.025*** 20.38 0.024*** 20.39 0.026*** 22.06 0.026*** 19.38 
 (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.095*** 78.13 0.091*** 77.51 0.090*** 76.77 0.105*** 79.47 
 (0.016)   (0.016)   (0.017)   (0.018)   
Sample 3698   3676   3496   2747  
Notes: Results here underly Panel A of Figures 1-3. Results from multi-level mediation models, estimating Equations (4)-(6). Each regression controls for the youth's sex, state of 
residence, whether (at age 14) they lived with both parents at age 14 and whether (at age 14) their mother was employed. The direct effect plus the mediating effects equals 100 
percent (subject to rounding). Standard errors presented in parentheses, for the mediating effects standard errors are bootstrapped (400 replications and sampled with replacement 
within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table B3. Multi-level mediation model results of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt – Intensive margin, Dropout. 
 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
Panel A. Early educational experiences: Num of schools Num of houses Suspended/Expelled ADHD 
Intergenerational correlation 3.271***   3.255***   3.258***   3.309***   
  (0.522)   (0.520)   (0.522)   (0.521)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.212*** 6.49 0.327*** 10.05 0.391*** 11.99 0.080* 2.43 
 (0.070)   (0.083)   (0.086)   (0.048)   
Mediator through Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0.071*** 2.17 0.127*** 3.92 0.207*** 6.35 0.035* 1.05 
(0.021)   (0.023)   (0.039)   (0.020)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.974*** 29.77 0.893*** 27.45 0.751*** 23.04 1.014*** 30.64 
 (0.159)   (0.162)   (0.148)   (0.165)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 2.014*** 61.58 1.907*** 58.58 1.910*** 58.61 2.180*** 65.88 
(0.500)   (0.500)   (0.499)   (0.499)   
Sample 3698   3650   3693   3690   
Panel B. Risky behavior mediators:  Smoker Drug use Delinquency Pregnancy 
Intergenerational correlation 3.559***   3.549***   3.549***   3.546***   
  (0.589)   (0.591)   (0.591)   (0.589)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.354*** 9.94 0.129** 3.64 0.387*** 10.91 0.253*** 7.14 
 (0.099)   (0.057)   (0.104)   (0.094)   
Mediator through Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 
 
0.179*** 5.04 0.086*** 2.43 0.208*** 5.85 0.085*** 2.41 
(0.047)   (0.036)   (0.048)   (0.031)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.680*** 19.09 0.843*** 23.76 0.662*** 18.64 0.857*** 24.18 
 (0.161)   (0.187)   (0.163)   (0.181)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 
 
2.346*** 65.93 2.490*** 70.17 2.292*** 64.6 2.351*** 66.28 
(0.557)   (0.563)   (0.561)   (0.556)   
Sample 2749   2741   2741   2764   
Panel C. Parenting mediators: Respectful Monitoring Lives independent Financial support 
Intergenerational correlation 3.650***   3.650***   3.271***   3.271***  
  (0.590)   (0.590)   (0.522)   (0.522)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.028 0.78 0.105** 2.88 0.118** 3.62 0.280*** 8.56 
 (0.030)   (0.053)   (0.055)   (0.077)   
Mediator through Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0.012 0.34 0.066*** 1.82 0.040** 1.23 0.150*** 4.59 
(0.012)   (0.026)   (0.018)   (0.030)   
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 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 1.000*** 27.41 0.927*** 25.41 1.004*** 30.68 0.892*** 27.27 
 (0.198)   (0.192)   (0.162)   (0.157)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 2.609*** 71.48 2.551*** 69.9 2.109*** 64.47 1.949*** 59.58 
(0.565)   (0.565)   (0.499)   (0.502)   
Sample 2686   2686   3698   3698  
Panel D. Attitudes & LOC mediators: Benefits too low Govt’s respons. Ambition important Locus of Control 
Intergenerational correlation 3.308***   3.234***   3.271***   3.539***  
  (0.537)   (0.525)   (0.522)   (0.588)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.172*** 5.21 0.029 0.9 0.010 0.31 0.047 1.34 
 (0.059)   (0.024)   (0.035)   (0.084)   
Mediator through Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.003 -0.09 -0.004 -0.13 0.002 0.07 0.008 0.23 
 (0.011)   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.015)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 1.059*** 32.02 1.158*** 35.8 1.072*** 32.77 0.966*** 27.3 
 (0.178)   (0.170)   (0.166)   (0.177)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 2.079*** 62.86 2.051*** 63.43 2.187*** 66.85 2.518*** 71.14 
 (0.516)   (0.503)   (0.501)   (0.557)   
Sample 3384   3522   3698   2749  
Panel E. Health mediators:  Depression Health limits work Obesity Physical exercise  
Intergenerational correlation 3.271***   3.156***   3.098***   3.510***   
  (0.522)   (0.519)   (0.516)   (0.587)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.051 1.55 0.092 2.92 0.049 1.58 0.033 0.95 
 (0.063)   (0.085)   (0.039)   (0.033)   
Mediator through Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0.015 0.46 0.016 0.5 0.008 0.27 0.006 0.18 
 (0.018)   (0.015)   (0.008)   (0.008)   
Dropout (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 1.013*** 30.98 0.961*** 30.47 1.082*** 34.93 0.994*** 28.32 
 (0.161)   (0.155)   (0.178)   (0.185)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 2.192*** 67 2.087*** 66.12 1.959*** 63.21 2.476*** 70.55 
 (0.498)   (0.493)   (0.497)   (0.562)   
Sample 3698   3676   3496   2747  
Notes: Youth outcome is total dollars of welfare ($’000). Results here underly Panel B of Figures 1-3. Results from multi-level mediation models, estimating Equations (4)-(6). Each 
regression controls for the youth's sex, state of residence, whether (at age 14) they lived with both parents at age 14 and whether (at age 14) their mother was employed. The direct 
effect plus the mediating effects equals 100 percent (subject to rounding). Standard errors presented in parentheses, for the mediating effects standard errors are bootstrapped (400 
replications and sampled with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.  
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Table B4. Multi-level mediation model results of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt – Extensive margin, ATAR score. 
 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
Panel A. Early educational experiences: Num of schools Num of houses Suspended/Expelled ADHD 
Intergenerational correlation 0.083***   0.079***   0.083***   0.084***  
  (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.004 4.9 0.007** 8.29 0.002 1.88 0.000 .03 
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 -0.15 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.49 0.000 0.01 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.005** 5.91 0.005** 5.95 0.004* 4.75 0.005** 5.65 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.074*** 89.34 0.067*** 85.65 0.077*** 92.88 0.079*** 94.32 
(0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   
Sample 1785   1775   1784   1782  
Panel B. Risky behavior mediators:  Smoker Drug use Delinquency Pregnancy 
Intergenerational correlation 0.078***   0.078***   0.078***   0.075***   
  (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 -0.54 -0.001 -0.94 0.001 1.34 0.000 0.22 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 
 
-0.000 -0.14 -0.000 -0.14 0.000 0.44 0.000 0.12 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.004* 5.64 0.005* 5.78 0.004* 5.44 0.005* 6.01 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 
 
0.074*** 95.04 0.075*** 95.3 0.073*** 92.78 0.070*** 93.65 
(0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)   
Sample 1476   1474   1474   1482   
Panel C. Parenting mediators: Respectful Monitoring Lives independent Financial support 
Intergenerational correlation 0.077***   0.077***   0.083***   0.083***  
  (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.021)   (0.021)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0 0 0.001 1.59 0.004* 4.31 0.000 0.5 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 0 -0.01 0.000 0.13 -0.000 -0.3 0.000 0.31 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
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 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.005* 6.21 0.005* 6.02 0.005** 6.4 0.004** 5.36 
 (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.072*** 93.79 0.071*** 92.26 0.074*** 89.59 0.078*** 93.83 
(0.022)   (0.022)   (0.021)   (0.021)   
Sample 1455   1455   1785   1785  
Panel D. Attitudes & LOC mediators: Benefits too low Govt’s respons. Ambition important Locus of Control 
Intergenerational correlation 0.092***   0.081***   0.083***   0.077***   
  (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.005** 5.75 0.003 3.12 -0.000 -0.21 0.000 0.23 
 (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 -0.27 -0.000 -0.32 -0.000 -0.05 0.000 0.02 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.006** 6.57 0.004* 5.51 0.005** 5.7 0.005* 5.88 
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.081*** 87.94 0.074*** 91.7 0.079*** 94.56 0.073*** 93.87 
 (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022)   
Sample 1653   1730   1785   1477  
Panel E. Health mediators:  Depression Health limits work Obesity Physical exercise  
Intergenerational correlation 0.083***   0.082***   0.082***   0.077***   
  (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.000 0.25 0.001 1.74 0.001 0.78 0.001 1.88 
 (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 0 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.2 -0.000 -0.14 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.005** 5.7 0.005** 5.86 0.004** 4.95 0.005* 6.42 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 0.078*** 94.05 0.076*** 92.37 0.077*** 94.08 0.071*** 91.83 
 (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022)   
Sample 1785   1781   1736   1477  
Notes: Results here underly Figure 5. Results from multi-level mediation models, estimating Equations (4)-(6), replacing dropout with ATAR score and conditioning on getting an 
ATAR score. Each regression controls for the youth's sex, state of residence, whether (at age 14) they lived with both parents at age 14 and whether (at age 14) their mother was 
employed. The direct effect plus the mediating effects equals 100 percent (subject to rounding). Standard errors presented in parentheses, for the mediating effects standard errors are 
bootstrapped (400 replications and sampled with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
  
62 
 
Table B5. Multi-level mediation model results of the intergenerational correlation in welfare receipt – Intensive margin, ATAR score. 
 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
Panel A. Early educational experiences: Num of schools Num of houses Suspended/Expelled ADHD 
Intergenerational correlation 1.279***   1.257***   1.281***   1.289***   
  (0.369)   (0.370)   (0.369)   (0.369)   
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) -0.007 -0.55 0.018 1.41 0.025 1.99 0.006 0.49 
 (0.036)   (0.047)   (0.026)   (0.007)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.004 -0.29 0.003 0.21 0.013 1.00 0.000 0.01 
(0.005)   (0.005)   (0.008)   (0.001)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.146*** 11.45 0.142*** 11.30 0.124*** 9.66 0.144*** 11.17 
 (0.060)   (0.057)   (0.052)   (0.059)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 1.143*** 89.40 1.094*** 87.09 1.119*** 87.35 1.138*** 88.33 
(0.370)   (0.372)   (0.368)   (0.368)   
Sample 1785   1775   1784   1782  
Panel B. Risky behavior mediators:  Smoker Drug use Delinquency Pregnancy 
Intergenerational correlation 1.231***   1.233***   1.233***   1.213***  
  (0.400)   (0.400)   (0.400)   (0.399)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) -0.004 -0.31 -0.005 -0.41 0.016 1.26 -0.011 -0.88 
 (0.013)   (0.017)   (0.031)   (0.016)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) 
 
-0.003 -0.26 -0.003 -0.25 0.009 0.75 0.003 0.21 
(0.007)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.003)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.127** 10.32 0.127* 10.27 0.114* 9.29 0.125** 10.30 
 (0.063)   (0.066)   (0.064)   (0.061)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 
 
1.111*** 90.25 1.114*** 90.38 1.093*** 88.70 1.096*** 90.38 
(0.398)   (0.398)   (0.398)   (0.398)   
Sample 1476   1474   1474   1482   
Panel C. Parenting mediators: Respectful Monitoring Lives independent Financial support 
Intergenerational correlation 1.196***   1.196***   1.279***   1.279***  
  (0.398)   (0.398)   (0.369)   (0.369)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough: 
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.004 0.31 0.002 0.19 0.068 5.34 0.033 2.56 
 (0.014)   (0.025)   (0.044)   (0.042)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 -0.01 0.003 0.23 -0.007* -0.58 0.008 0.61 
(0.001)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   
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 coeff % coeff % coeff % coeff % 
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.129** 10.79 0.126* 10.53 0.157*** 12.25 0.134** 10.45 
 (0.066)   (0.066)   (0.062)   (0.058)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 1.063*** 88.91 1.065*** 89.05 1.061*** 82.99 1.105*** 86.39 
(0.396)   (0.396)   (0.367)   (0.369)   
Sample 1455   1455   1785   1785  
Panel D. Attitudes & LOC mediators: Benefits too low Govt’s respons. Ambition important Locus of Control 
Intergenerational correlation 1.381***   1.257***   1.279***   1.227***  
  (0.392)   (0.373)   (0.369)   (0.400)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.069* 4.98 0.034 2.74 -0.015 -1.18 0.004 0.32 
 (0.039)   (0.026)   (0.023)   (0.020)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.007 -0.54 -0.008* -0.66 -0.001 -0.10 0.001 0.04 
 (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.183*** 13.23 0.144*** 11.45 0.141*** 11.05 0.126** 10.25 
 (0.065)   (0.056)   (0.058)   (0.058)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 1.137*** 82.33 1.087*** 86.48 1.154*** 90.23 1.097*** 89.39 
 (0.392)   (0.373)   (0.367)   (0.397)   
Sample 1653   1730   1785   1477  
Panel E. Health mediators:  Depression Health limits work Obesity Physical exercise  
Intergenerational correlation 1.279***   1.276***   1.209***   1.227***  
  (0.369)   (0.370)   (0.362)   (0.400)  
Effect of parental welfare operating thorough:         
Mediator (𝛼𝛼3𝛾𝛾1) 0.004 0.29 0.030 2.37 0.017 1.44 0.025 2.01 
 (0.021)   (0.043)   (0.023)   (0.034)   
Mediator through ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿3𝛾𝛾1) -0.000 0.00 0.001 0.05 0.004 0.35 -0.003 -0.23 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.004)   (0.004)   
ATAR score (𝛼𝛼4𝛿𝛿1) 0.143*** 11.18 0.143*** 11.20 0.104** 8.64 0.135** 10.97 
 (0.059)   (0.056)   (0.045)   (0.059)   
Direct effect of parental welfare (𝛼𝛼1) 1.132*** 88.53 1.103*** 86.38 1.083*** 89.57 1.071*** 87.25 
 (0.367)   (0.367)   (0.361)   (0.397)   
Sample 1785   1781   1736   1477  
Notes: Youth outcome is total dollars of welfare ($’000). Results here underly Figure A1. Results from multi-level mediation models, estimating Equations (4)-(6), replacing dropout 
with ATAR score and conditioning on getting an ATAR score. Each regression controls for the youth's sex, state of residence, whether (at age 14) they lived with both parents at age 
14 and whether (at age 14) their mother was employed. The direct effect plus the mediating effects equals 100 percent (subject to rounding). Standard errors presented in parentheses, 
for the mediating effects standard errors are bootstrapped (400 replications and sampled with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table B6. Overview of the mediating role of specific risky behaviors on the intergenerational 
correlation between parental and youth welfare participation – Extensive margin.   
 Overall (coeff) 
Direct 
(coeff) 
Mediating 
(coeff) 
Mediating /  
Overall (%) Sample 
Conditional intergenerational 
correlation  
0.120***    3826 
(0.0164)     
Risky behaviorsǂ  0.130*** 0.104*** 0.026*** 19.7 2813 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.005)    
   Smoker    0.009*** 6.95  
   (0.003)    
   Ever tried marijuana   -0.001 -0.48  
   (0.001)    
   Tried marijuana before age 15    0.000 0  
   (0.000)    
   Monthly marijuana use   0.003* 1.92  
   (0.001)    
   Used illicit drugs   -0.001 -0.58  
   (0.001)    
   Alcohol problems   0.001 0.53  
   (0.001)    
   Trouble with police   0.003 1.98  
   (0.002)    
   Attended juvenile court   0.001 0.86  
   (0.001)    
   Ran away from home   0.003* 2.26  
   (0.002)    
   Hangs with a bad crowd   0.001 0.81  
   (0.002)    
   Pregnancy    0.007*** 5.43  
   (0.002)    
Notes: Regression estimates of the baseline model outlined in Equations (1)-(3) underly these results. Youth welfare 
receipt is captured by welfare participation over the ages 23-26. Each regression includes the following control 
variables: sex, state of residence, whether they lived with both parents at age 14, and whether their mother was 
employed at age 14. The direct plus mediating effect equals the overall effect coefficient (subject to rounding). 
Standard errors presented in parentheses, for the mediating effect standard errors are bootstrapped (400 replications 
and sampled with replacement within sampling strata). *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels respectively.   
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Figure B1. Mediating the intergenerational correlation between parental welfare participation 
and youth total dollars of welfare – Early-life experiences operating through ATAR score. 
Panel A. Early educational experiences 
  
Panel B. Risky behaviors  
 
 Panel C. Parenting practices  
 
Notes: Mediation results are based on regression estimates of Equations (4)-(6), replacing dropout with the ATAR 
score. The direct effect of parental welfare participation on youth welfare participation is 100 minus the total indirect 
effect. Underlying results and statistical significance of the mediating effects are presented in Appendix Table B5. 
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